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Abstract 
NGOs have been consistently excluded from multilateral proceedings in the security and 
disarmament sector where states are concerned about their national security interests. 
And yet, they have found avenues to participate in the multilateral process through the 
negotiation of treaties, provision of expert research and testimony, systematic monitoring 
of state compliance, documentation of UN proceedings, and even as members of 
government delegations. This paper explores the conditions that enable NGOs to engage 
directly in the state-centric system of the United Nations, addressing political 
opportunity, enabling resources, and institutional support. I explore how NGOs 
contribute to international politics, using a constructivist approach, to consider the 
important role NGOs play in the security and disarmament sector. 
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Chapter 1 - NGOs and the UN System 
In various fora at different times in the history of the UN, NGOs have been at the 
centre of proceedings, or at the distant periphery, barred from substantive discussions. In 
the security and disarmament sector, however, NGOs have been consistently excluded 
from proceedings with a national security and disarmament theme. Peter Willetts 
(1996:1), an expert on the place of NGOs in the UN system, in differentiating between 
'high' and 'low' politics on the international agenda observed: "Governments expect to 
dominate disarmament negotiations, military alliances, armed conflicts and the 
international arms trade. On the other hand, they will usually be cautious about claiming 
any authority at all in sport and religious affairs". NGOs have a long history of activism 
on the 'peace' agenda around specific conflicts and particularly on nuclear disarmament, 
but until recently, the security and disarmament field has not seen NGOs in a prominent 
role. Directly engaged in the negotiation of treaties, the provision of expert research and 
testimony, systematic monitoring of state compliance, the documentation of formal UN 
proceedings, and as members of government delegations, NGOs have found recently 
found avenues to participate in UN activities in various security and disarmament areas. 
What conditions have enabled NGOs to engage directly in the state-centric system 
of the United Nations? Specifically, why has the security and disarmament sector seen 
the proliferation of highly specialized NGOs and individuals functioning in roles that 
complement official processes? Openness to NGOs, access to new operational tools, and 
an increasingly supportive institutional environment all contributed to the emergence of 
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such actors. With the end of the Cold War, the explosion of internet-based 
communications, and the emergence of new non-state actors engaging in the political 
process across national lines, the environment for NGO engagement in the UN system 
changed dramatically in the 1990's and set the stage for these initiatives. NGOs have 
found new ways to employ their skills in what has historically been a closed area of 
multilateral diplomacy, partnering with states and UN agencies in the provision of 
services. These NGO initiatives contrast to the image of global civil society that emerged 
in the 1990's, but I would argue are indicative of democratization in international politics 
and the blurring of the line of state sovereignty in the UN arena. 
Non-governmental activity in the security and disarmament sector has generally 
fallen into two categories: activism, typified by mass rallies, protests and publicity stunts; 
and advocacy, including letter-writing, lobbying and information dissemination for public 
awareness. Service NGOs have always existed in the humanitarian aid and development 
fields, working in close cooperation with governments in the delivery of aid programs. 
The record of NGO activity in the multilateral realm grew extraordinarily in the 1990's 
with activity around the major UN summits, as well as meetings of the international 
economic institutions, and smaller international meetings like the G8, APEC and World 
Economic Forum that drew organizations from around the world. The protests of the new 
'anti-globalization' movement were first seen in 1999 at World Trade Organization 
Ministerial meeting in Seattle and subsequent G8 and World Economic Forum meetings. 
Terms such as 'global civil society' and 'transnational civil society' emerged in the 
policy literature in an extensive debate around a new 'third force' in international 
politics.1 
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At the same time, however, non-govemmental organizations working in the 
multilateral context began to employ tactics that mirrored the corporate world. 
Employment of specialized experts; the production of highly refined marketing materials; 
targeted fundraising and publicity strategies; as well as new information dissemination 
tools, became increasingly common across various NGO sectors. This 
'professionalization' of NGO activity borrowed tools and strategies from business, think 
tanks and government agencies to implement new operational projects. Among 
international and specialized NGOs, the UN system was the locus for this activity. These 
borrowed skills laid the foundation for NGOs to fulfill roles perceived to be in the 
domain of states. Through the provision of services such as treaty monitoring, document 
collection and as expert advisors to governments, NGOs assumed central roles in the 
multilateral system. The pre-eminent case of an NGO in this capacity is the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines. 
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
Among the most important multilateral accomplishments of the 1990's was the 
negotiation of the 1997 "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction", familiarly 
called the Landmines Ban or Mine Ban Treaty. The NGO community - led by the ICBL 
as an umbrella network of over 1200 partner organizations - was instrumental in calling 
for the ban on antipersonnel mines.2 Upon the ICBLs inception in 1992, the founding 
organizations issued a "Joint Call to Ban Antipersonnel Mines" and brought together a 
network of like-minded NGOs from the humanitarian, development, human rights, arms 
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control and faith sector.3 Together, the NGOs and national campaigns that made up ICBL 
worked with a group of sympathetic governments that ultimately became the drivers 
behind the so-called 'Ottawa Process'.4 The ICBL's strategy to achieve a landmine ban 
focused on providing evidence-based research on the effects of antipersonnel (AP) mines 
on civilians; lobbying sympathetic governments to address the problem internationally; 
and levying public awareness of the issue. Critical research by Human Rights Watch and 
the International Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC) established the baseline research 
about the humanitarian effects of anti-personnel mines. Subsequently, NGOs in mine 
affected regions provided victim testimony and field research, while the ICBL engaged 
high profile public figures to garner media support for the issue. The network structure of 
the ICBL broadened the activism and advocacy around the issue and later in the process, 
information technology enabled the participation of groups from developing and mine-
affected regions.5 
The ICBL broke new ground in the disarmament sector through its close 
collaboration with governments to realize the goal of a Mine Ban Treaty. The landmines 
campaign itself is widely regarded in the NGO community as a model of a successful 
campaign strategy: the groundwork was laid with strong research; the network featured 
affected people, public figures and nationally-based campaigns; and NGOs worked with 
governments throughout the - admittedly unusual - negotiations.6 But IBCL's leadership 
did not stop with the achievement of the Treaty; attention shifted to monitoring the 
Treaty's implementation through the Landmine Monitor project. In its preface to the first 
Landmine Monitor annual report in 1999, the ICBL noted that this was "the first time that 
non-governmental organizations are coming together in a coordinated, systematic and 
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sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly 
document progress and problems." 
Although the ICBL case is exceptional, it is a useful example of NGOs 
performing tasks and fulfilling roles typically belonging to state parties and UN agencies 
in the security and disarmament sector. Following the successes of the ICBL and the 
emergence of Landmine Monitor, there has been a profusion of efforts by NGOs in other 
security areas to perform treaty verification or document treaty implementation using 
similar methods. NGOs are also performing documentation services, providing the 
primary repositories of statements and official documents pertaining to a certain treaty or 
UN body ensuring public access to the record of proceedings. Others are engaged in 
treaty negotiations or implementation as consultants, NGO representatives and official 
delegates in areas where previously NGOs were kept at the sidelines. Chayes and Handler 
Chayes (1995: 252) describe the variety of parallel and supplementary roles played by 
NGOs in regime management: 
They are independent sources of information and data that can be used by the 
regime. They help to check and verify party reporting. In many cases, they 
provide the basic evaluation and assessment of party performance that is the 
fulcrum of the compliance process. They have provided technical assistance to 
enable developing-country parties to participate in treaty negotiation and 
administration and to comply with the reporting and sometimes the substantive 
requirements of the treaty. They perform mediating and facilitating services. 
Where there is noncompliance, they are key to public exposure, shaming, and 
popular political response. In a real sense, they supply the personnel and resources 
for managing compliance that states have become increasingly reluctant to 
provide to international organizations. 
This paper will explore the evolution of NGO activity in the security sector to 
consider why NGOs are increasingly assuming essential roles and responsibilities. At a 
general level, there is both an opening for NGOs to fulfill these roles and some level of 
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support for them to become involved in this way. On one hand, NGOs appear to be 
meeting needs not otherwise met in the various treaty regimes, by incapacity or 
negligence. On the other, there appears to be increased acceptance to the participation of 
NGOs in the international, multilateral system. New tools are enabling the NGOs to 
provide such complimentary services, supported by professional tactics to project 
implementation. 
In the security and disarmament context, where NGOs have historically focused 
on advocacy and activism, new activities are observed demonstrating a high degree of 
professionalization and integration. The cases to be examined in depth are the ICBL's 
Landmine Monitor system; the documentation and archival services provided by the 
Reaching Critical Will project in the nuclear disarmament field; and contributions by 
individual experts on official government delegations in the small arms, biological 
weapons and nuclear regimes. The intention is to gain insight on the variety of NGOs that 
are engaged in the provision of key services in the security and disarmament, 
acknowledging that some are very small projects with narrow functions, or relatively 
new, but others are large, well-funded research groups. The examples cover a wide range 
of activities, including official UN bodies, formal treaties with broad adherence, and 
instruments of a more informal character. 
The conditions that have enabled NGOs to contribute to the security and 
disarmament field will be discussed in terms of opportunity, means and institutional 
support. Changing state relations, and therefore multilateral dynamics, in the post-Cold 
War will be explored to consider how, in a system defined by sovereign state 
membership generally closed to direct NGO engagement, opportunities emerged for 
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NGOs to assume these roles. The case studies demonstrate incidents where a lack of 
capacity among states has enabled NGOs to supplement official efforts, and others where 
NGOs fill a gap in the institutional framework of the regime. There is evidence that some 
state parties were open to NGOs expertise, advocating their engagement, and this 
leadership will be considered. 
The political opportunity to take on such roles is important because in most cases 
a new initiative was designed, expanding the NGOs mandate to engage in this activity. 
But NGOs also require the means to implement these programs. In this light, I will 
consider how organizational developments have facilitated the move from traditional 
NGO activism and advocacy to professionalized service provision. This will require an 
exploration of new tools, namely information technology, human resources, and 
strategies including outreach and research programs that have become essential features 
of many NGOs' work. States' openness to NGO contributions is in part a result of the 
perception that NGOs have specialized skills and expertise that generalist government 
officials do not share. I will explore the notion of an increasingly 'professionalized' NGO 
sector. 
The initial entry into these NGO activities required opportunity and means, but 
the growth in this area stems from external and relationships with key institutional actors. 
There was a climate of openness to engagement with NGOs in the multilateral 
environment, fueled by donor support for such initiatives, and the leadership of key 
states. A shift within the UN agencies themselves to promote increased cooperation with 
NGOs will also be considered, including recent panel studies on UN-NGO interaction. 
Each of these conditions - the opportunity, means and assistance for NGO participation in 
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the security and disarmament sector - will be explored against the case study evidence in 
an analysis of NGO engagement in what was previously a sector with limited direct NGO 
participation. 
The research for this paper has relied on a combination of secondary sources and 
factual interviews with individuals involved directly in each of the three cases. These 
interviews included email and telephone communication as well as face-to-face meetings 
and were non-standardized. A complete list of interviewees is attached as Appendix 1. As 
a former project associate with a Canadian peace and disarmament NGO, I have first-
hand experience working with Reaching Critical Will and with some of the individual 
NGO experts, and personally served as an NGO Representative on the Canadian 
delegation to the 2003 NPT PrepCom in Geneva, Switzerland. To minimize personal bias 
I have endeavoured to examine other projects with which I am familiar only by 
reputation.7 
Defining Concepts 
There are three primary elements to be examined in this study, NGOs, states, and 
the security and disarmament sector, each of which requires some discussion to clarify 
terminology. This discussion will probe further into the historical relationship with NGOs 
in the UN system; the sovereign state and its roles and responsibilities; and the nature of 
the security and disarmament sector within which this NGO behaviour is observed. 
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Sovereignty and Multilateralism 
The study of international politics, particularly according to the neo-realist and 
neo-liberal paradigms, is fundamentally state-centric, and examines the balance of power 
between sovereign states. The principle of sovereignty - defined by Christian Reus-Smith 
as "the notion that the state should hold absolute authority within its territory and 
recognize no higher authority outside" (1998:7) - is the qualifier of statehood. The Peace 
of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 established this principle and a 
system of territorially bound sovereign states in Europe. While sovereignty has evolved 
from absolutist monarchical regimes, to the current dominant political system of 
democratic states operating within the multilateral system, statehood still prioritizes 
territorial sovereignty.8 A discussion of sovereignty and state in the multilateral system is 
a useful starting point for this analysis of NGO engagement in that system. 
The United Nations Charter identifies sovereign states as its Members, as per 
Article 2, which outlines the organization as being "based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members" (Article II, Paragraph 1). Attributes of the 
sovereign state as identified in the Charter include: territorial integrity, political 
independence and jurisdiction over domestic affairs. Membership is obtained therefore by 
virtue of holding status as a sovereign state and signing the Charter, which thus entitles 
the state to a vote in the General Assembly, representation on the Security Council and 
Economic and Social Council on a rotating basis, and participation in all other UN bodies 
and treaties according to their specific membership rules and procedures. Chapter VII of 
the Charter provides additional insight on the concept of state sovereignty, with respect to 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The enforcement 
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measures defined in Chapter VII, determined by decision of the Security Council and 
with mutual cooperation of the Membership, must be consistent with Paragraph 7 of 
Article II. The intervention clause respects state sovereignty, ensuring that the Members 
of the UN do not "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state" (Chapter I, Article 2, Paragraph 7). Ongoing debates about 
military intervention in cases of humanitarian crisis are focused on the principle of state 
sovereignty and the limitations outlined in the Charter. 
The primary unit of analysis in the study of multilateralism is the sovereign state. 
Multilateralism is articulated through the various organs of the United Nations, including 
its formal committees, subsidiary and partner bodies, and the framework of treaties and 
agreements that together constitute our system of global governance. John Gerard Ruggie 
(1992: 571) provides a definition of 'multilateralism' that engages its qualitative 
attributes, as: 
"an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states in 
accordance with generalized principles of conduct - that is, principles which 
specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the 
particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in 
any specific occurrence." 
While often 'multilateral' is used in reference to a global or universal body, this is not 
always true; indeed the term 'plurilateral' is often used instead of multilateral to describe 
an institution made up of a small group of states. However, multilateralism assumes that 
states engage in a relationship with an agreed framework for cooperation. 
A discussion of statehood and what this means in the multilateral system is 
instructive with regard to the engagement of NGOs in the security and disarmament field. 
It is sovereign states, as UN Members, that have specific rights, so defined in the Charter, 
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of participation in UN bodies. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines the 
parameters of Treaty law, outlining the terms and conditions of states' adherence to a 
treaty. These rights as UN members or states party to a treaty also entail certain 
responsibilities. The relationship between rights and responsibilities of UN Members is 
described in Article 2 of the Charter, which states: "All members, in order to ensure to all 
of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the 
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter" (Charter I, Article 
2, Paragraph 2). These responsibilities vary according to the body or document, but can 
be summed up as cooperation with other Member states, contribution to the operation of 
the UN system, and compliance with the requirements of its constituent bodies and 
agreements. 
Non-State Actors 
The non-state actor or group is simply defined as any entity made up of private 
actors without legal status as a sovereign state. The term is used to describe a range of 
groups, in contrast to the legal state, and by definition NGOs are non-state actors together 
with intergovernmental organizations, commercial actors, criminal cartels, and rebel 
groups. In the introduction to their analysis of non-state actors in international relations, 
Reinalda, Arts and Noortmann (1998) identify three categories of non-state actors: 
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Figure 1: Non-State Actors 
Non-governmental Non-governmental 
public-interest-oriented profit-oriented 
(non-profit) 
Public-Interest NGOs Business INGOs 
Governmental public-
interest-oriented 
Trans-
national 
actors 
International 
Actors 
NGOs, private 
organizations or social 
movements: 
• Proper NGOs 
• Governmentally 
organized NGOs 
• Quasi-NGOs 
• Donor organized 
NGOs 
• Grassroots 
Organisations 
• Citizen networks 
• International 
NGOs 
• Internationally 
active national 
NGOs 
• Transnational 
corporations 
(TNCs) 
• Criminal 
organizations 
Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) 
Transgovernmental 
actors* 
*refers to cross-border 
relations between 
representatives of 
(semi-)governmental 
institutions below 
government level 
• Nation-states or 
governments 
representing 
them 
• Inter-
Governmental 
Organisations 
Reproduced from Reinalda, 1998:13 
While useful particularly for classifying the range of public-interest non-governmental 
organizations, Reinalda's table demonstrates the limitations of the term 'non-state actor'. 
It has some utility to compare entities against sovereign states, but its generality requires 
further precision for clarity, as is evident in light of the range of NGOs alone, and 
therefore it will be avoided. 
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Non-Governmental Organizations 
A variety of other terms are often used interchangeably with 'NGO', complicating 
the question of its definition. Gordenker and Weiss list alternative usages for the NGO 
sector including: "...independent sector, volunteer sector, civic society, grassroots 
organizations, private voluntary organizations, transnational social movement 
organizations, grassroots social change organizations and non-state actors" (1996: 18). 
The commonly used term 'civil society' is the subject of intense debate, complicated in 
that NGOs are made up of members of civil society, and alternatively form part of civil 
society with a wide range of additional groups. Further, there is wide discussion of the 
emergence of a global or transnational civil society and the place of NGOs in that 
phenomenon.10 Other terms, including grassroots organizations (GROs) and community-
based organizations (CBOs), are used to describe local NGOs, but will not be used 
because these are less useful in the multilateral context.11 
In order to minimize definitional pitfalls, the term non-governmental 
organization, or NGO, will be used exclusively in this paper because it is the most widely 
accepted term for those organizations that are engaged in political activity in the 
multilateral process as private organizations without the authority and rights of states. 
The principles outlined in Resolution 1996/31 of the Economic and Social Council of the 
UN, the current version of the NGO Statute, provide a useful framework within which to 
define the term NGO. Although these principles apply specifically to the designation of 
an NGO in consultative status with ECOSOC, they provide accepted standards within the 
multilateral context. The second principle holds that an organization "shall be in 
conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" 
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and the third that an NGO "support the work of the United Nations and to promote 
knowledge of its principles and activities." Principles 10-12 speak to the established 
nature of an NGO, in terms of its constitution and governance structures, underlining that 
organizations established by a government do not qualify. A final general principle notes 
that NGOs are non-profit organizations. These broad principles thus disqualify entities 
such as guerilla groups, criminal groups or organizations that espouse violence, political 
parties, and corporate or profit-driven entities.13 The line between NGOs and academic 
institutes can also be unclear, so for the purpose of this study organizations affiliated with 
an academic institution will be included, when they have a separate governance structure 
and act as a non-profit.14 
The ECOSOC principles speak to the attributes of NGOs, but are less illustrative 
of intention or objective. In general terms, NGOs advance principled positions on 
relevant international issues in order to bring their moral authority to bear in the influence 
of policy change. Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002:4) define NGOs as "private, 
voluntary, nonprofit groups whose primary aim is to influence publicly some form of 
social change." There is an implicit assumption that organizations driven to influence 
social change make an inherently positive contribution to civil society and are like-
minded in their principles. Normative claims about the intentions of NGOs are 
problematic, as is evident in the small arms and light weapons context, where gun control 
coalitions that advocate strong gun control legislation and affiliates of the National Rifle 
Association, proponents of the right to bear arms, participate together in the UN process. 
In her review of the literature on NGOs in the development field, Claire Mercer (2002:9) 
observes a pre-dominant "allegiance to the normative ideal that civil society and NGOs 
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are inherently 'good things'; microcosms of the (liberal) democratic process, comprised 
of the grassroots, both separate and autonomous from the state, while acting as a 
'bulwark' against it." 
Gordenker and Weiss (1997:20) propose a definition which holds that NGOs are 
"private citizens' organizations, separate from government but active on social issues, not 
profit making, and with transnational scope." They add the useful caveat to their 
definition regarding transnational scope, or organizations "having transnational goals, 
operations or connections, and active contacts with the UN system" (1997: 20). 
Technically grassroots or community-based organizations may share the same 
characteristics of internationally focused NGOs, and may even be larger or more active, 
but it is the domestic focus of their work that differs. To that end, it is organizations with 
a transnational scope that are of interest in my research, regardless of size. Gordenker and 
Weiss further distinguish between NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations or IGOs, 
which have unique membership structures, usually made up of national affiliates. 
International NGOs or INGOs are described as organizations with an international 
framework or federative, multi-state membership, however this term will be avoided 
here. While some of the case studies are very small and localized groups, all have a 
distinctly international focus, though only the ICBL would technically constitute an 
INGO. This distinction is useful in considering not the essential characteristics of the 
organization, but the focus of its work. Mary Kaldor (2003: 82) in her work on Global 
Civil Society also suggests 'international NGO' is a misleading term that assumes 
organizations without an international structure do not have an international interest: 
"Indeed almost all social movements and NGOs, including parochially minded 
nationalist and religious groups, have some kind of transnational relations. 
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Precisely because these groups inhabit a political space outside formal national 
politics (parties and elections), they address a range of institutions (local, global 
and national), they operate through links with a range of international institutions 
(NGOs, inter-governmental organizations, foreign states, Diaspora groups) and 
they often receive funding from abroad." 
NGOs as 'Quasi-State' Actors? 
The term 'quasi-state' was first used by Robert H. Jackson in his book, Quasi-
States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World to describe the weak 
states that emerged in the collapse of colonialism. Defined by their legal status as 
sovereign entities, Jackson depicts quasi-states as those states that possess negative 
sovereignty, or freedom from external intervention (by virtue of their sovereignty), as 
opposed to positive sovereignty, or the freedom to act and deter (because of their limited 
military power).15 This application has been used further to examine the roles of African 
states and micro-states in the UN context.16 The term 'quasi-state' has some utility in 
discussing NGOs, used not as a noun to describe a category of state, but as an adjective to 
describe the kind of activity in which that non-state actor is engaged. This usage suggests 
that the actor has assumed a state-like quality because of the official nature of its 
involvement in the specific multilateral context. 'Quasi-state' could describe those 
functions that are expected of the membership of a Treaty by the relevant security and 
disarmament organ, or its support system within the UN, which for whatever reason are 
not being implemented so NGOs have unilaterally taken on that responsibility. 
There are, however problems with the use of the term 'quasi-state' to describe 
non-state actors that have assumed responsibilities that would typically fall to states or 
agencies in the UN system. It suggests that such NGOs have a state-like level of agency 
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and self-determination, implying that they have equivalent rights in the UN system, 
including a right to vote, which is not the case. Further, the term infers that NGOs seek a 
state-like status in these roles, which is misrepresentative of NGOs that value highly their 
independence in the UN system. For these reasons, 'quasi-state' will not be used. The 
term 'de facto' is appropriate to some degree in describing activities that have assumed a 
quasi-official place within the regime. But I will avoid categorizing the ways in which 
NGOs are partnering in the implementation of the specific Treaty or operation of the UN 
body, except to describe how these tasks are complimentary to state and UN mechanisms. 
While on one hand serving the health of the regimes, NGOs gain unique access to 
governments not previously seen in the security and disarmament field through these 
functions. The place of NGOs within the broader international system has a long history, 
and the limited role for NGOs in the security and disarmament sector must be understood 
within this context. 
The Historical Interplay between NGOs and the UN 
The history of NGO-UN relations is older than the current UN system itself: a 
wide range of grassroots, community and even international NGOs pre-date the 
establishment of the League of Nations. A substantial community of NGOs including the 
World Alliance of YMCAs, International Committee of the Red Cross, Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, Woman's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Save the 
Children International Union, among others, was established by the end of World War I. 
Through the 1920's the NGO community, led by the Union of International Associations, 
promoted the League of Nations and participated in the early proceedings of League 
17 
meetings and committees. Bill Seary observes that this relationship ultimately changed: 
"In general, the interaction between the League and international NGOs changed from 
one of NGOs supporting and contributing to the policy work of the League to one where 
the League was less interested in the opinions of NGOs but more willing to provide 
information for and about them" (1996:26). 
The NGO community was active in the negotiations that led to the agreement of 
the United Nations Charter at the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization held in San Francisco in 1945. Education, health and human rights themes 
were undoubtedly elevated in the final draft text because of the lobbying of NGOs, 
particularly the representatives of major US organizations. But the greatest success at 
the conference was the inclusion of Article 71 in reference to the Economic and Social 
Council, which states: 
"The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with 
matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with 
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations 
after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned." 
It was recognized that NGOs had competencies in social and economic themes, and their 
input on these issues could have value to states. Notably, from the outset, issues of 
national security were considered outside the realm of NGO expertise. In 1946, a 
committee was established under ECOSOC to define the nature of the ECOSOC 
consultative relationship, made a Standing Committee of ECOSOC in 1947. Through the 
Standing Committee discussions NGOs were defined as international, regional and 
national organizations, though with limited roles for nationally-based NGOs. The 
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evolution of these categories over the successive iterations of the NGO statute is outlined 
below: 
Figure 2: Levels of ECOSOC Consultative Status for NGOs 
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Throughout the Cold War, NGO engagement in the UN system grew, with the 
greatest increase among those organizations included on the Roster, the small or 
specialized organizations. During this period, Cold War politics came to bear on 
ECOSOC consultative status negotiations. In 1968, Resolution 1296 was adopted by 
ECOSOC, requiring that NGOs report to the Council on their activities, allowing for 
suspension of consultative status if it was determined that the NGO received government 
financial influence, engaged in politically motivated acts against States Members of the 
UN, or "had not made any positive or effective contribution to the work of the Council or 
its commissions or other subsidiary organs" in the preceding three years (Section 36, Part 
VIII). Although this change resulted in intense debate and states instigated votes on the 
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status of several organizations, Willetts observes that the NGO community emerged from 
this period "virtually unscathed" (1996:33). 
Another avenue for NGO engagement with the UN was created in 1968, when 
ECOSOC adopted Resolution 1297 regarding the partnership between the UN 
Department of Public Information and NGOs. The outcome was the establishment of the 
DPI/NGO Section and an associational relationship with NGOs for the purpose of 
information dissemination and exchange. Based on criteria, consistent with the ECOSOC 
Statute, an NGO with "the commitment and the means to conduct effective information 
programmes with its constituents about UN activities" can acquire associated status, upon 
approval by the DPI review committee.18 At a working level, the UN Non-Governmental 
Liaison Service provides services both to the UN system and to NGOs to enhance their 
cooperation. A major component of this work is a range of news and information 
products and orientation materials for NGOs seeking to participate in UN activities.19 
ECOSOC accreditation remains the primary, though not sole means of NGO cooperation 
with UN member states; however, this was challenged by developments at the World 
Summits of the 1990s. 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
commonly known as the Earth Summit, was an important event in the history of UN-
NGO relations for a number of reasons. The representation of civil society at the 
conference was unprecedented, with some 2,400 non-governmental actors attending the 
Summit while an additional 17,000 representatives participated in a parallel non-
governmental forum,20 many of which were not from NGOs with consultative status. But 
more importantly, the Earth Summit was the first major UN conference to adopt rules of 
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procedure that expanded the participation of NGOs beyond ECOSOC parameters to 
include 'relevant non-governmental organisations'. The rules of procedure adopted in the 
preparatory process defined NGO participation as including the right to submit written 
presentations as official UN documents and make oral interventions at the discretion of 
the Chair. Notably, the rules of procedure did not require that these NGOs have ECOSOC 
status per Decision 1/1 of the Preparatory Committee, noted in UN document A/45/46 
(1991: 22-3). As a consequence, the Earth Summit had a lasting impact on the 
relationship of NGOs with the UN in that its concluding document, Agenda 21, explicitly 
called for "Procedures [to] be established for an expanded role for non-governmental 
organizations, including those related to major groups, with accreditation based on the 
procedures used in the Conference" (Paragraph 44, Chapter 38, UN Document 
A/Conf.151/26). Having opened the accreditation process to 'relevant NGOs', the 
Summit set a standard that broadened the potential community of NGOs involved in the 
multilateral process beyond the limitations in the ECOSOC Statute. 
The explosion of NGO activity in conjunction with the World Summits saw the 
multilateral system impacted by the activity of non-governmental actors operating within 
grassroots networks, virtual communities (for the first time) and international campaigns. 
Much of this organized activity was enabled by the nascent internet boom. Even with the 
end of the world summits, the tide had shifted and NGO activity around UN proceedings, 
major conferences and treaty negotiations was changed dramatically. Fundamentally this 
was the result of sheer growth. Estimations of the number of active NGOs are just that, 
estimations: they vary greatly depending on the definition of 'NGO' employed. As of 
October 2007, there were 3051 organizations in consultative status with ECOSOC.21 The 
21 
most widely used figure for NGOs engaged in the UN system is that of the Union of 
International Organizations which in its 2007/8 edition, tallies some 52,000 international 
non-governmental organizations. Approximations of the number of global grassroots, 
non-profit and community-based organizations range widely, to the millions. 
The Security and Disarmament Sector 
This study focuses on the security and disarmament sector, a term used as 
shorthand for what is actually a comprehensive regime of treaties, multilateral sub-treaty 
level agreements and UN-affiliated bodies that deal with security themes. Two arms of 
the UN have responsibilities for security and disarmament: the UN General Assembly 
through its First Committee, within which the total membership of the UN debates, and 
votes by majority on, a wide range of security questions in consideration of thematic 
resolutions; and the UN Security Council (UNSC), which is mandated by the Charter to 
undertake enforcement actions under the parameters of Chapter VII and is made up of a 
rolling membership with five permanent members who have a right of veto. The 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the cornerstone of this regime, because it maintains 
sole responsibility for formal negotiation of disarmament treaties. A unique institution, 
the CD does not have universal state membership; rather, it is made up of the five nuclear 
weapon states and sixty others and periodically considers entrance of new members. 
Under these official bodies comes a range of multilateral treaty-level agreements, which 
address specific disarmament programs. Among these are the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Biological and Toxin 
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Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. A range of agreements that are at the sub-
treaty level also fall into this category, with the Kimberley Process for the Certification of 
Rough Diamonds and the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
among these. 
By its nature, the security and disarmament sector deals with issues that are 
perceived to be sensitive because of their implications for national security. Debates over 
potential enforcement actions against a state of concern, or negotiations that require frank 
discussion of domestic military assets or policies, are approached with caution and 
restraint by most states. Consistent with the state-centric view of international affairs, 
security themes have typically been viewed as 'hard politics' in the domain of 
governments. Although at its creation UN member states recognized the possible value of 
NGO input on economic and social themes in Article 71, no such provision was made for 
consultation with NGOs on security issues. Neither the Security Council nor the General 
Assembly had any allowance for NGO participation or formal avenues for consultation 
however NGOs have long pursued informal means to engage with states around these 
themes. Without any direct channels for participation, an NGO Working Group on the 
Security Council was established for informally coordinated exchange with UNSC 
member states.24 Most major NGOs maintain offices in New York to monitor 
proceedings and lobby states. The CD is interesting in this regard as all negotiations 
occur in closed session with no direct participation by NGOs and plenary meetings have 
only limited opportunity for observation by members of the public. There is however 
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extensive informal exchange with CD members, fostered by a strong Geneva-based 
disarmament community including the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. Annually 
on International Woman's Day, a statement is read to the CD membership by the highest-
ranking UN official in Geneva on behalf of the NGO community.25 
The security and disarmament treaties have a range of arrangements governing 
NGO access that differ significantly from the rules of procedure for standing UN bodies. 
While for example, general debates and opening speeches in most conferences of states 
parties are open to NGO observers, substantive discussions are typically held in closed 
session. NGO participation in annual meetings of states parties, preparatory committees 
and review conferences is for the most part limited to the hallways of the UN where 
distribution of materials and organization of seminars and briefings takes place outside 
the official conference hall. In some instances, for example meetings of the NPT Review 
Cycle and the Biennial Meetings of States on the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons, NGOs are granted a limited time to make presentations to the plenary. Unlike 
the human rights sector, which is centered on the UN High Commission on Human 
Rights with its annual Human Rights Council meeting where accredited NGOs can make 
interventions, the security and disarmament sector has no single dedicated UN body. 
Multiple processes, some centered in Geneva and others in New York or Vienna, deal 
with a range of technically disparate and sensitive themes with different rules for NGO 
participation, and thus dilute NGO engagement on the wider agenda. 
In the development and humanitarian sectors, NGOs have long been seen as 
partners of states and UN agencies, acting as service providers and sub-contractors in the 
delivery of food aid, medical services, emergency relief and implementation of broader 
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development initiatives. Multi-million dollar international relief organizations, or national 
grassroots operations, such service NGOs regularly operate as field agents for UN and 
state aid agencies. Particularly useful in times of conflict, this relationship enables donors 
to channel funds to local service providers, reducing overhead, engaging domestic actors 
without costly external involvement, and alleviating concerns about allegiances. While 
NGOs are major voices in the human rights and environmental fields, the relationship 
between states and NGOs is generally more antagonistic. Security-based UN organs, 
including the multilateral disarmament treaties, the CD, First Committee and Security 
Council have typically featured limited direct NGO participation and regularly operate in 
closed sessions. Yet, it is in these areas where there are several significant cases of NGOs 
performing important functions, including treaty monitoring and verification, 
documenting official proceedings of UN bodies, acting as an informal treaty secretariat, 
and even participating directly in treaty negotiations and reviews. 
In a multilateral system where membership is dependent on statehood, and 
particularly in the politically sensitive security and disarmament sector, how have NGOs 
come to play such roles in the proceedings of UN bodies and treaties? It is in the balance 
of rights and responsibilities where NGOs have found a niche within which to perform 
functions that are within the purview of states, but which are not otherwise being done. 
An opportunity to engage with states in this way has fueled the emergence of highly 
professionalized NGO behaviour. In some cases, states are negligent in maintaining 
certain tasks or functions of a regime, whether by unwillingness or lack of capacity. In 
other cases, states openly welcome NGO engagement, providing support for activities by 
way of financial aid, access to official proceedings or policy statements. Before 
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examining particular cases in detail, it will be useful to consider international relations 
theory, primarily constructivism, with regard to NGO roles in world politics. A 
theoretical model will be introduced in a discussion of how NGOs engage in the 
multilateral system. Finally, a theoretical development that was seen in the security and 
disarmament sector in the immediate Post-Cold War years, the discourse around 'human 
security', will be examined because it challenged the pre-eminence of state sovereignty 
and provided an opening for greater NGO engagement in the multilateral arena. 
26 
Chapter 2: A Constructivist Framework for NGO 
Engagement in Multilateralism 
Tremendous growth in the NGO sector in the last 20 years has inspired a 
profusion of research on the relationship between NGOs and the United Nations and the 
impact of NGOs on international politics. William DeMars (2005: 36) in his critical 
analysis of NGO theory observed that NGOs received little serious attention during the 
Cold War, but they ".. .continued to burrow into the nooks and crannies of world politics 
whether or not scholars paid any attention. Finally, in the early 1990s, NGOs became 
impossible to ignore, and the decline of security threats made it possible for scholars to 
see them." The evolution of the literature has traced developments in international 
relations theory more broadly. I will consider elements of the three major theoretical 
approaches with regard to NGO contributions to world politics. Then, a model will be 
introduced that considers how NGOs adapt their approaches to engage with states in the 
multilateral system. 
Realism is a political theory based on an understanding of the nation state as the 
primary unit of politics, which functions in the national interest so as to retain and 
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increase political power. John J. Mearsheimer (1994: 10) provides a useful summary of 
realism, describing it as being predicated on five assumptions about the state system: the 
international system is anarchic; states inherently possess some offensive military 
capability; there is always uncertainty about the intentions of other states; the motive of 
states is survival; and states always think strategically to maintain their sovereignty. 
Realist approaches have largely ignored non-governmental actors as having no real 
power in international politics, or as Peter Willetts summarized: "If international relations 
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in the traditional view concerns the interactions between 'states', which seek to mobilize 
'power' to promote their respective 'national interests', then pressure groups [NGOs] are 
not relevant to international relations" (1982: 1). Realism provides useful perspective 
about the state decision-making calculus, but as NGOs become increasingly active in the 
multilateral context, realism has not grown to account for the NGO role in the 
international system, thus inspiring a variety of theoretical responses. 
Early interpretations of non-state actors' engagement in international politics 
sought to account for the impacts of the range of political actors on the international 
system, while retaining the central tenets of realism.27 In the 1970's, neo-liberal 
transnationalists first addressed non-state actors' contributions to international politics. 
Keohane and Nye (1970: 380) proposed a new 'world politics' paradigm to "broaden the 
conception of actors to include transnational actors and conceptually break down the 
'hard shell' of the nation-state." But their analysis gave limited attention to broader civil 
society including NGOs; rather it focused on the economic realm. Peter Willetts (1982) 
responded to their work with his analysis of'pressure groups', defined as transnational 
political actors that 'mobilize legitimacy' separate from the exercise of military power 
and disposal of economic resources. Grounded in liberalism, these approaches maintained 
a state-centred approach but accounted for other influences on state decision making. 
The third dominant international relations theory adopts the view that politics has 
a social base, that governments are 'social organs' made up of people whose complex 
relationships affect the decisions made by governments. Critical theory includes a cluster 
of approaches but the one of particular interest here is Constructivism. The primary 
concern of the Constructivist approach is structure; however, this is viewed as a multi-
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faceted social construction including both tangible and intangible components. Wendt, a 
leading proponent of Constructivism, describes a rational approach, whereby state 
interests are "in important part constructed by systemic structures, not exogenous to 
them" (Wendt, 1995:75). Arguing that these social structures are not merely concepts, 
Wendt describes them as having three elements: shared knowledge, material resources, 
and practices, which act as "collective phenomena that confront individuals as externally 
existing social fact" (Op cit: 75). 
Constructivism has spawned a variety of theories that have explanative power 
with regard to NGO roles in international relations which will be considered more fully. 
The 'global norm' is one social structure that is widely debated in international relations, 
and is of particular interest in terms of NGO impacts on the multilateral system. Martha 
Finnemore cites an accepted definition of a norm as "a standard of appropriate behavior 
for actors with a given identity" which "embodies a quality of 'oughtness' and shared 
moral assessment" (Finnemore/Sikkink, 1998:891-2). Jeffrey Checkel explains how 
Constructivists modified the neo-liberal view of norms as a creation of states serving a 
regulatory function, without causal force: "For constructivists, by contrast, norms are 
collective understandings that make behavioral claims on actors. Their effects reach 
deeper: they constitute actor identities and interests and do not simply regulate behavior" 
(1998: 327-328). Scholars developed a norm 'life cycle' (See Figure 3) to describe the 
institutionalization of norms.29 
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Figure 3: Stages of Norms 
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NGOs contribute to the development of a global norm at various points in its 
lifecycle, particularly through the emergence and cascade stages as promoters of the 
norm. Sometimes founded specifically for the purpose of promoting an emerging norm, 
NGOs can provide the organizational structure within which norm entrepreneurs operate 
in persuading states to adopt the norm, as was seen in the landmine case by the ICBL. In 
the early stages of norm growth, NGOs socialize a norm by drawing attention to it, 
engaging the public in the 'cascade' process. The cases to be explored in this paper show 
another aspect of norm development as the various NGOs are engaged in 
institutionalizing the respective norms, working with states in increasing the legitimacy 
of what is either a new, or not fully developed norm. These NGOs are acting as norm 
promoters. 
The literature on the role of non-state actors, including NGOs, in norm 
development has been expanded to consider the specific attributes that these actors offer 
to the norm life cycle. Primarily, NGOs are seen to hold unique moral authority within 
the realm of international politics, where they are considered a 'third sector' or 'third 
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force' distinct from government and commerce. Khagram et al (2002: 11) describe the 
function of this third sector: 
If the business sector has been characterized by the drive for profit and the 
government sector by the use of authority, the third sector, or nongovernmental 
sector, could be characterized by the search for meaning. The individuals and 
groups in this sector are primarily motivated to shape the world according to their 
principled beliefs. 
In his review of the burgeoning normative literature on transnational activism in the late 
1990's, Richard Price argues that "transnational activists [a term inclusive of NGOs] 
derive their authority from three principal sources: expertise, moral influence, and a claim 
to political legitimacy" (2003: 587). It is the perception of both a principled position and 
expertise that generates the notion of NGOs having authority on an issue, and thus 
holding political legitimacy in international relations. 
Expertise is the underlying concept in Peter Haas' notion of an 'epistemic 
community' defined as a "network of professionals30 with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (Haas, 1992: 3). Epistemic communities, 
drawing on their independent expertise on a specific issue, affect the policy making 
process by informing decision-makers and influencing social institutions. This approach 
does not assume correctness or truth in the information, but describes the manner in 
which experts as part of an epistemic community facilitate consensus on a policy 
question (Op cit: 23). While the literature on epistemic communities has generally 
focused on natural or social scientists, the term can be applied to other areas, and is 
applicable to the security and disarmament sector where technical expertise and value-
based policy approaches are prevalent.31 That is not to say that the entire disarmament 
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community of NGOs is a unified epistemic community, as clearly there is not a 
universally agreed rationale, policy approach or specific outcome among all actors. 
Martha Finnemore, in her work, National Interests in International Society, 
observes the role of persuasion in norm development, noting: "Normative claims become 
powerful and prevail by being persuasive; being persuasive means grounding claims in 
existing norms in ways that emphasize normative congruence and coherence" (1996: 
141). While her focus is the legal sector, she argues that states are made up of people 
whose preferences are malleable and can be affected by persuasive arguments. The 
element of persuasion is an important consideration with regard to NGOs, as deemed 
experts or moral authorities on an issue. NGOs that have political access through the 
multilateral system increase their ability to influence and persuade states of policy 
positions. Therefore, the influence of NGOs on norm growth is enhanced when they are 
directly engaged in international politics with the ability to employ persuasion. 
The theoretical framework for this study must take into account on one hand, the 
ways in which NGOs contribute to world politics as non-state actors, and on the other 
hand the ways in which NGOs adapt to engage with states to affect politics. Early 
pluralist ideas recognized the contributions of non-state actors in international relations 
and neo-Liberal Institutionalists further clarified how non-state actors contribute to 
politics in a state-centric world. But Constructivists expanded international relations with 
a sociological interpretation, identifying the range of social structures impacting the 
policy-making process and the different actors engaged in politics. They accept that states 
make policy decisions by interpreting a range of social elements, allowing for non-state 
actors to impact the policy process. This theoretical perspective is useful in defining some 
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of the ways in which NGOs acquire 'political legitimacy' in the international arena as 
norm promoters, moral authorities and epistemic communities. All of these attributes can 
be observed in the case studies of NGOs in the security and disarmament sector. While 
constructivism provides broad-brush categorization of NGO roles, useful in a discussion 
of what impacts NGOs have on world politics, its focus still rests with the state. Kerstin 
Martens calls the work to date on NGOs one-sided, identifying motives for their 
cooperation with IGOs and their influence on the international process, but failing to 
explain impacts of international engagement on the NGOs themselves (2005: 16). In light 
of my interest in the emergence of professionalized NGOs engaged in the security and 
disarmament field, this challenge is a relevant one. 
A Model of NGO Institutionalization and the International System 
The "new transnationalists" of the 1990's revisited the concept of'transnational 
relations' first debated in the 1970's. Defined as "regular interactions across national 
boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a 
national government or an intergovernmental organization" (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 3), the 
focus of 'transnationalism' was narrowed. It was focused on identifiable actors linked 
across at least two societies, including those promoting principled positions, namely non-
governmental organizations, coalitions and transgovernmental networks; and those 
motivated by economic gain, namely multinational corporations. The previous 
transnationalist debate stalled on arguments over the state-centric view of international 
relations, toward which the new transnationalism adopts a broad view: 
One can subscribe to the proposition that national governments are extremely 
significant in international relations and still claim that transnational actors 
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crucially affect state interests, policies and inter-state relations. Confusing the 
impact of transnational relations on world politics with a "society-dominated" 
view of international relations leads one to overlook the more interesting question 
of how inter-state and transnational relations interact. One does not have to do 
away with the "state" to establish the influence of transnational relations in world 
politics. (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 15) 
Responding to developments in institutional theory the transnationalist approach 
examines two variables: domestic structures - the political institutions, societal structure 
and policy networks of the state - and international institutions. Domestic structures are a 
determinant of the degree to which non-state actors impact policy development in 
different states, while international institutions facilitate transnational relations and act as 
channels whereby transnational actors access governments. The approach posits that the 
interaction between domestic structures and international institutions determines impact 
on the policy process. This theory is adopted and slightly expanded by Kerstin Martens as 
the basis for her model of NGO institutionalization.32 
Martens' research assesses NGO activities in the humanitarian and human rights 
sectors by employing a theoretical model to assess adaptation through interaction with the 
UN and provides some useful guidance for this study. She describes three broad 
categories of activities engaged in by NGOs and how patterns of NGO activity change 
with respect to IGOs. Her research assumes the transnational approach to describe 
internal and external variables that affect NGO relationships with IGOs (Martens, 2005: 
13-14). Her explanatory model considers the internal characteristics of the NGOs, or their 
composition, and their external function, how they institutionalize relations with the UN, 
as variables affecting the kind of activities in which they engage (See Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: NGO Institutionalization in the UN System - expanded model 
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The basic model is useful with regard to NGO activity in the security and 
disarmament sector, but it has some limitations and requires broadening. The model 
proposed by Martens is designed for international NGOs, made clear by her description 
of NGO composition as 'transboundary' and the more precise qualifiers of'centralist' or 
'federative'. Although Martens seeks to describe 'Characteristics of Internationally 
Operating NGOs' (emphasis added, 2005: 25), she assumes that there are only two types: 
international federations of loosely connected, independent NGOs, or strongly linked 
national organizations with a central head representative. Having based her model partly 
on what she calls the trans-social approach, this is perhaps not surprising, but it begs the 
question as to whether small, specialized NGOs operating at the UN level but without 
international affiliates or a network structure would fit the model. She hypothesizes that 
the loose structure of federative organizations increases their willingness to adapt in order 
to be recognized by the UN, while centralist organizations operate through many 
channels and are less dependent on UN relations (2005: 29-30). It can be correlated that, 
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like a federative network, a small, specialized NGO also would be dependent on its 
relationship with the UN as its primary vehicle to operate internationally. 
The second NGO characteristic she describes is function, of which she identifies 
two: advocacy, described as agenda setting and policy input, and service, which she 
limits to humanitarian assistance and development aid. The case studies selected by 
Martens apply with regard to both composition - all are international NGOs with either a 
centralist or federative framework - and also function; they are limited to the human 
rights (advocacy) and development (service) sectors. Her narrow model of NGO 
function, with case studies chosen to fit it perfectly, is not sufficiently flexible to include 
the kind of activities seen in the security and disarmament sector. These cases show 
attributes of more traditional advocacy work requiring the policy expertise she 
recognizes, but provide services to states not unlike sub-contracted aid delivery. This 
problem is also evident in her description of NGO activities, which include policy 
initiating activities (agenda setting, information provision and lobbying); policy 
developing processes (policy advice and formulation); and policy implementing practices 
(cooperation and sub-contracting in completing specific tasks) (2005:18). This final 
category is limited it to delivery of services related to humanitarian aid and "support to 
people in need" (2005:31). Specialized NGOs with a high level of expertise and 
professionalization act in many ways more like a service NGO. 
Of greater value in Marten's model is its recognition that the element of 
institutionalization of NGO relations with the UN system is a factor that affects changes 
in NGO activities. She describes two types of institutionalization: internal organizational 
modifications and external demands on organizations that regulate behaviour. To assess 
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the optimization of organizational structures to facilitate interaction with other social 
groups and mobilize necessary resources, Martens includes indicators such as 
representation in New York or Geneva, division of labour with respect to UN activities, 
and issue specialization. External institutionalization is explicitly a constraint of the UN, 
assessed through formal association with the UN as dictated by consultative 
arrangements. Unfortunately, her parameters are narrow and only include the official 
ECOSOC, Department of Public Information, and Non-Governmental Liaison Service 
channels of UN affiliation, not rules of procedure that govern individual Treaties, 
conferences or UN organs and which vary widely. 
There are some areas in this model that would be better viewed with a wide lens, 
but I would also argue that there are fundamental gaps in Martens' model. First, her 
analysis of external institutionalization does not sufficiently account for the political 
context of UN institutions. Assuming a monolithic UN, or IGO as she regularly calls it, 
does not take into account the dramatically different political contexts across UN bodies 
and issue areas, which are always in flux depending on political circumstances. The 
championing of NGO participation by a state, or complete obstruction of NGOs by 
others, reflects particular state interests, linked with the specific issue under examination. 
Accounting for NGO participation in a specific UN body or forum cannot be limited to 
the consultative arrangements defined under ECOSOC; rules of procedure in some cases 
are re-negotiated regularly and the role of a meeting or committee Chairperson - who 
always represents a state, with its domestic interests - can be very important in how 
NGOs are accommodated.33 Second, she limits her analysis to change within existing 
organizations. Cases in the security and disarmament sector show several instances where 
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new NGOs were created to fill a given function. The element of opportunity, or the 
political context, is therefore a key factor affecting why NGOs pursue a particular project 
or strategy. This could be interpreted negatively - whereby the need is not otherwise 
being met and thus NGOs assume responsibility for it - or positively - whereby NGOs 
are invited or welcomed to take the subject role. 
Elements of Martens' model provide useful guidance for the examination of 
behaviour among NGOs in the security and disarmament sector, but it will not be applied 
dogmatically to the case studies. Rather, my analysis will begin with a consideration of 
the political climate within which the cases have emerged in the security and 
disarmament field, to assess the element of 'opportunity', the opening by which each 
project was created. Secondly, consistent with Martens' model and the analysis of NGO 
characteristics, I will examine the composition and function of the various NGOs, or 
what I see as the 'means' with which they are enabled to pursue this kind of activity, 
including specific resources at their disposal and organizational structure. Finally, taking 
into account 'institutionalization', I will consider interaction with the UN and other 
governments, or what may be regarded as institutional support to implement the projects. 
Martens' model acts as a framework for this analysis and Constructivism lends 
further insights into the roles NGOs play in international relations. But to further frame 
this analysis, a major policy development that coincided with the growth of direct NGO 
engagement in the security and disarmament sector will be examined in depth. The 
Human Security debate was important with regard to NGO participation in the 
proceedings of the UN and as an umbrella concept it impacted all three elements of this 
study: opportunity, means, and assistance. 
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The Human Security Paradigm 
The release of the UN Development Programme's Human Development Report in 
1994 spawned an academic debate, new security paradigm and NGO advocacy tool that 
made humans the referent subject of security. Adopting an individualistic approach to 
security reminiscent of early liberal philosophy, the human security discourse presented a 
challenge to traditional state-centered security.34 The greatest challenge with regard to 
this concept of human security is consensus on a definition, with a fundamental debate 
over scope. The UNDP report proposed a seven part 'agenda' of human security 
addressing economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political 
security with the individual as the central reference point. The report rejected the 
traditional focus on state security ensured by armaments, to describe human security in 
terms of freedom from fear and freedom from want (UNDP, 1994: 24). The 2003 report 
of the independent Commission on Human Security adopted a broad perspective defining 
human security as the means "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that 
enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.. .from critical (severe) and pervasive 
(widespread) threats and situations" (Chapter 2, p 4). Taylor Owen asserts that this 
approach differentiates human security from human development in that it denotes 
urgency, where dire emergencies risk the vital core of the individual, rather than a 
'laundry list of threats' (2004: 19). 
A much narrower approach espoused by a Canadian school of theorists focuses on 
violent threats to the individual, consistent with a more traditional security perspective 
but viewed from a different point of reference and thus embracing a wider range of 
threats.35 Andrew Mack has criticized that the broad agenda mixes independent and 
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dependent variables by assuming that interconnected factors like war, hunger and poverty 
all threaten human security, thus minimizing its explanatory value. Similarly, Keith 
Krause argues that the broad definition "does not allow us to see what is distinctive about 
the idea of 'security', and how it is inextricably tied up with the threat and use of 
violence" (2004: 368). The 'freedom from fear' approach, with its focus on violent 
threats to individuals, is attributed with having expanded the multilateral security agenda 
by elevating issues affecting woman, children and civilians through debates over 
landmines, small arms and light weapons, conflict resources, and child soldiers. 
Human security has received wide attention in the multilateral security and 
disarmament sector among 'middle power' states.36 Canada championed the notion, 
notably under Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, and its leadership on 
landmines was framed in terms of human security. The Commission on Human Security 
was established in 2001 by Japan to promote public understanding; develop the concept 
of human security as a policy tool; and propose a program of action to address critical 
and pervasive threats to human security. Several states that embraced the concept as a 
framework for their multilateral policy joined to form the Human Security Network in 
1999 at a Ministerial Meeting in Norway, adopting a list of common principles. Member 
states38 cooperate to develop common positions from a human security perspective and 
have worked on landmines, the International Criminal Court, children in armed conflict, 
small arms and light weapons, trans-national organized crime, and human rights. A 
fundamental objective of the Network is to "energize political processes aimed at 
preventing or solving conflicts and promoting peace and development", and this goal is 
pursued in part through cooperation with NGOs. At its second Ministerial Meeting in 
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Lucerne, Switzerland (2000), the Network recognized the role of NGOs in "developing, 
advocating, building and implementing human security" and "undertook to work 
nationally and in international fora to promote greater engagement, inclusivity and 
transparency between governments and civil society on human security issues." 
More than a decade after the 1994 UNDP report launched the debate about human 
security, the human security concept remains somewhat ambiguous, however the 
fundamental elements are agreed: individuals are the focus of a human security paradigm, 
not states; threats to individuals' security extend beyond traditional, militaristic threats 
and are linked with human development; and human rights and humanitarian law have a 
central role in the paradigm, thus challenging the immutability of state sovereignty. 
Advocates of human security question absolute state sovereignty and have inspired an 
intense debate around its limitations in cases of dire humanitarian crisis. The issue of 
humanitarian intervention and the parameters of Chapter VII of the UN charter were the 
subject of a dedicated International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
which in 2001 issued its final report, entitled "A Responsibility to Protect". The events 
that led up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 saw adaptation of this discussion, notably 
by Anne-Marie Slaughter and Lee Feinstein (2004), to justify intervention in sovereign 
states to respond to threats from weapons of mass destruction. They proposed "a 
collective 'duty to prevent' nations run by rulers without internal checks on their power 
from acquiring or using WMD" (Feinstein and Slaughter, 2004: 136). 
The human security debate also drew attention to the role of NGOs in the security 
sector, particularly in light of NGO leadership in the landmines case. From the 
conceptual shift to make individuals the referent subject of security, a logical conclusion 
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holds that citizen's organizations and NGOs could have useful insights and potentially 
important contributions to build up that security. Several states that have championed a 
human security agenda are also proponents of NGO access to multilateral proceedings 
and major funders of NGO activities. Canada created a Human Security Program, 
renamed the Glyn Berry Program for Peace and Security in 2006, with funds to support 
projects by NGOs, academic institutions, and even foreign governments or international 
organizations working in relevant areas.39 The Swiss government funds a range of human 
security-related research institutes, notably the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining and the Small Arms Survey. And governments including Canada, Sweden, 
New Zealand and Mexico speak regularly in the NPT context on NGO access rights. 
The human security debate challenged immutable state sovereignty and as a 
consequence, supported civil society. The conditions that enabled NGOs to find openings 
in particular security and disarmament bodies by which to assume new roles broadly 
coincided with growing acceptance of a human security paradigm. It is therefore an 
important consideration with regard to the political climate, or element of opportunity, for 
NGOs to participate in the state-based system. While this policy discussion certainly 
contributed to political openness to NGO activity among some states, other dynamics 
were at play in each of the specific cases. These will be examined in detail, beginning 
with the important example of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and 
its assumption of a monitoring role for the Antipersonnel Landmine Ban Treaty. 
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Chapter 3: A Political Opportunity 
Considering that NGOs are external actors, with limited rights of participation in 
the state-based UN system, it is useful to commence discussion of the case studies by 
considering the element of opportunity. What are the openings used by NGOs to become 
involved in key roles in the security and disarmament sector? The element of opportunity 
has both external and internal aspects, driven by other actors or the organization's 
program interests. I will consider external impacts including interaction among states 
parties and between specific states and the NGO, as well as gaps in the particular regime. 
Internal aspects include moral or organizational interests in pursuing the activity. For the 
three case studies the element of opportunity was a pre-determinant of the NGOs 
becoming engaged in the particular project that has ultimately come to play a central role 
in maintaining the regime. 
The Landmine Monitor: A Logical Extension of NGO Leadership 
The leadership of the ICBL in achieving the Mine Ban - in cooperation with a 
network of NGO partners, a core group of supportive states, and prominent international 
organizations including the ICRC - was introduced in the opening chapter. The role of 
the ICBL in the lead-up and Treaty negotiation phases40 has been examined in depth in 
the policy literature but I will consider a lesser-studied part of the story: the origins and 
development of Landmine Monitor. Landmine Monitor is the pre-eminent example of an 
NGO assuming a role to implement a treaty on behalf of states party. Its annual report on 
state compliance with the Treaty and progress towards its universalization has become 
the de facto monitoring and verification system for the Treaty. The 'opportunity' seized 
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by the ICBL to take on the monitoring function was an extension of its successful work 
leading up to the Ottawa Process. In order to understand more fully why the ICBL took 
on the monitoring function, it will be important first to consider the Treaty itself, namely 
its compliance and verification scheme. Secondly, I will examine the important 
relationship between the ICBL member organizations that founded Landmine Monitor 
and the states that acted as patrons of the project. This interaction was a continuation of 
the important NGO-state cooperation that reached fruition with the Ottawa Process and 
was instrumental in the Landmine Monitor's creation. 
The Mine Ban Treaty contains very modest compliance measures. Article 7, 
entitled "Transparency Measures", establishes a reporting requirement, and Article 8, 
"Facilitation and clarification of compliance", outlines the means which states can use to 
resolve compliance questions.41 Article 7 requires that states submit status reports to the 
UN Secretary-General on their progress to implement the Treaty, including national 
implementation measures, the number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, the location of 
mined areas, mines retained for training purposes, status of destruction and de-
commissioning programs, total destroyed anti-personnel mines, and nature of mines 
produced (See Appendix 2 for complete text). Parties are required to submit their first 
report within 180 days of the Treaty's entry into force after ratification and to update the 
information annually. The primary characteristic of the Treaty's compliance scheme, 
therefore, is its reliance on states' self-reporting, both to establish the baseline against 
which implementation is measured and to demonstrate subsequent progress.42 The Treaty 
has no formal verification mechanism by way of independent monitoring or inspections 
to verify the content of voluntary reports, nor a technical secretariat or standing body to 
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collect and assess the contents of the reports, rather this task falls to the states parties. 
Subsequent to the transparency measures in Article 7, Article 8 allows for states to seek 
clarification of questions pertaining to compliance by submitting a formal Request for 
Clarification through the UN Secretary General to the State Party. However, such 
measures carry immense political weight and they are therefore used very infrequently. 
The voluntary reporting measures of Article 7, and lack of any means for 
independent verification of state compliance, are viewed by many as weaknesses in the 
Treaty. Findlay (1999) has traced the negotiations to show where there was divergence 
around the issue of verification, with some states such as the US and Australia favouring 
robust mechanisms, while Mexico and many African states argued there was no need for 
any verification mechanism. A compromise position, supported by Canada, called for 
moderate measures that would allow for negotiations to proceed without becoming 
bogged down over the technicalities and expense of verifying a total ban on such a 
widely used weapon. In his assessment of the Treaty's compliance measures, Findlay 
notes: "The Ottawa Convention is a hybrid treaty, having antecedents in both arms 
control and international humanitarian law (IHL). Its verification and compliance 
provisions sit indeterminably between the two traditions - more robust than some 
humanitarian law but weaker than the best arms control models" (1999: 46). The hybrid 
approach calls for transparency and cooperation among the member states to implement 
the Treaty with self-reporting on progress. 
Weakness in the Treaty's compliance and verification scheme provided the major 
impetus for an independent Treaty monitoring system. The concept of NGOs monitoring 
state compliance was a novel idea but had precedents from the human rights sector. The 
45 
Dr. Andrew Latham first proposed the concept in a 1995 paper for the Canadian 
Verification Research Unit and briefly referenced it in 1996 within the context of 
negotiations on landmines in the Treaty on Certain Conventional Weapons.44 In the early 
negotiations of the Mine Ban, the subject of verification surfaced and the NGO 
monitoring network concept was revisited as a possible option. Bob Lawson, the 
Canadian official that served as the government's primary liaison with the ICBL and 
driver behind Canadian leadership in the Ottawa Process, reintroduced Latham's idea in 
discussions with sympathetic states and ICBL leadership.45 The Canadian government 
hosted a roundtable on verification during the Ottawa Conference with government 
representatives and introduced the idea of NGO verification and a subsequent 'non-
paper', authored by Lawson, acted as a proposal for the Landmine Monitor.46 There was 
interest from both governments and the ICBL in retaining the cooperative relationship 
that had developed through the Ottawa Process, and an NGO monitoring effort was 
proposed as a possible means to do so. The leadership and credibility of one of the lead 
agencies, Human Rights Watch, was an important influence on states whose support was 
essential for the project in its early days. 
The ICBL also had an institutional interest in pursuing the monitoring role. Mary 
Wareham notes that ICBL was interested in maintaining media attention on the 
landmines issue and had built considerable research capacity during the campaign that 
could be built upon (2007: 22-23). The Landmine Monitor also provided a raison d'etre 
for the ICBL to continue once its campaign goal had been reached.47 After six months of 
preparatory discussions, and with the backing of partner states, the ICBL met in Sweden 
in June 1998 to decide whether or not it would proceed with the project. The Network 
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reached agreement on supporting Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative under a core 
group of member organizations.48 
From the outset, Landmine Monitor was intended to complement the reporting of 
states parties required by the Treaty: "(Landmine Monitor) was created in the spirit of 
Article 7 and reflects the shared view that transparency and cooperation are essential 
elements to the successful elimination of antipersonnel mines. But it is also recognition 
that there is a need for independent reporting and evaluation."49 The project states in the 
"About Landmine Monitor" section of each Executive Summary that "the Landmine 
Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an 
attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have 
taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines." Operating outside of the formal 
parameters of the Treaty, Landmine Monitor provides independent monitoring of states' 
actions, though without robust verification. Its emphasis is on transparency through 
public reporting on implementation of the Treaty that can include 'shaming' when non-
compliance is seen. Unlike an official treaty reporting mechanism, the annual report 
includes assessments of both member and non-member states' compliance with the 
Treaty's key requirements. As such, it seeks both to hold states party accountable and 
encourage broader adherence to the norm of the mine ban. Although as an informal 
mechanism, Landmine Monitor has certain limitations, Steve Goose observed that 
Landmine Monitor is "not official and we don't want to be official. If we're official then 
we become the ISU (Implementation Support Unit) and have to 'serve' the States Parties' 
(Cited in Wareham, 2007: 36). 
The core group of NGOs that undertook such a large-scale and expensive project 
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accepted the risk that the effort would not gain traction with governments. But evident in 
Landmine Monitor's statement above is the sense of a moral imperative to monitor state 
behaviour, underlined by the notion of 'holding them accountable'. The humanitarian 
argument that played such an important role in achieving the mine ban by emphasizing 
the indiscriminate impacts of landmines, gave the ICBL a certain moral authority once 
the ban was achieved, evidenced by Jody Williams winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1997 on behalf of the ICBL.5 The principled position that the ICBL had espoused and 
promoted throughout the campaign became an impetus for it to expand its work into the 
monitoring function and retain the 'high ground', holding states accountable for the 
Treaty's implementation. In addition, the Landmine Monitor provided a raison d'etre for 
the ICBL to continue once its campaign goal had been reached.51 Having acted as norm 
entrepreneur and promoter, the ICBL through Landmine Monitor has assumed a key role 
in promoting the further institutionalization of the norm against AP mines. 
The opportunity to create Landmine Monitor grew out of the unique partnership 
between NGOs and government that evolved through the Ottawa Process. Because the 
Treaty lacked a robust verification mechanism, NGO monitoring was seen as a possible 
means to support the limited compliance measures in the Treaty. At the same time, the 
ICBL saw an opportunity to provide a new focus for the international network, building 
on its reputation as a moral force in the landmine campaign. The result was the 
establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism whereby the ICBL could 
promote the institutionalization of the norm against landmines and further its goal of a 
world without landmines. 
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Reaching Critical Will: Necessity is the Mother of Invention 
Reaching Critical Will (RCW) is a project of the Women's International League 
for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) with a mandate to increase NGO engagement in 
international disarmament fora, both in terms of NGO preparation for and direct 
participation in multilateral proceedings. RCW facilitates NGO activities at official 
disarmament events by arranging meeting space, coordinating NGO statements to plenary 
meetings (when permitted) and assisting with general logistics, It has also developed a 
comprehensive website with an array of disarmament related resources, freely accessible 
to the public. Through this website, RCW has gradually assumed a role not being filled 
by states or the UN in a comprehensive way: it has become the primary publicly 
accessible repository of multilateral disarmament-related documentation. 
The coordination role envisioned for RCW when WILPF was designing the 
project recognized that not all NGOs could be in New York or Geneva for multilateral 
disarmament meetings. Therefore, among its activities, RCW prioritized dissemination of 
information to educate and inform grassroots organizations working domestically: "For 
non-governmental organizations, and concerned individuals to act, they need information, 
primary documents and analysis. Reaching Critical Will collects, packages and often 
translates disarmament related information into terms ordinary people can understand." 
Materials collected by RCW are published on its website at www.reachingcriticalwill.org 
in order to educate and inform the NGO community. Staff members attend official 
proceedings to collect original documents including official UN documents, government 
interventions and working papers from the Conference on Disarmament, UNGA First 
Committee, NPT review process, and UN Disarmament Commission. These are then 
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scanned and posted online as part of RCW's centralized library of disarmament 
documentation. 
Unlike Landmine Monitor, the central documentation role that RCW has assumed 
was never the explicit intention for the project; rather, in seeking to provide education 
tools to better equip the nuclear community for its advocacy and activism, the project has 
grown into a unique documentation service used widely by academics, officials and the 
NGO community. Nor was the impetus for this work a response to a single shortcoming 
in the multilateral disarmament regime, or the result of direct governmental support. 
RCW has grown over time, in the absence of any other similar documentation service, to 
become an essential resource in the disarmament regime. To better understand the origins 
of the RCW project, I will discuss briefly the disarmament and arms control NGO 
community and challenges to NGO accessibility at the multilateral level, which together 
created the opportunity to create RCW. 
In 1995, at the 5th Review Conference (RevCon) of the NPT, an indefinite 
extension of the Treaty was negotiated.53 Many NGOs viewed the extension as a 
continuation of the status quo, with no hard timelines for nuclear disarmament, and 
protested it vigorously. Others supported the extension as a means of institutionalizing 
the disarmament norm and retaining the Treaty framework for ultimate disarmament. The 
division within the NGO community was seen during the Review and Extension 
Conference when several organizations refused to join 60 members of the Abolition 
Caucus, who opposed the extension, in signing a declaration calling for abolition of 
nuclear weapons.54 Although the disarmament community is considered generally like-
minded, it is characterized by range of organizational approaches from abolitionists to 
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arms controllers that use different tactics including grassroots activism and high-level 
advocacy.55 In the aftermath of the 1995 RevCon, there was concern within the NGO 
community about a lack of coordination among the disparate grassroots peace 
organizations, research institutes, and disarmament groups, and the negative impact of 
this division on NGO effectiveness at international meetings. 
The effectiveness of this divided and uncoordinated NGO community was further 
strained because of limitations on NGO access in UN disarmament meetings, specifically 
NPT events. Generally speaking, NGO access to multilateral disarmament fora is limited: 
accredited NGOs are permitted to access the UN facilities where they can attend open 
sessions sitting in the gallery or at the back of meeting hall as observers with no right to 
intervene in the deliberations.56 Regularly, substantive debates or negotiation of text 
occurs in closed session from which all members of the media and NGO observers are 
barred. Standing bodies like the CD allow accredited NGO observers to sit in the gallery 
with limited formal interaction with officials. The NPT rules of procedure are gradually 
becoming more accommodating: since 2000, NGOs have been granted one three-hour 
slot to make presentations to the plenary at all PrepComs and RevCons and in 2004, the 
thematic debates, or so-called 'Cluster Debates', were open to NGO observation for the 
first time.57 Because of the restrictions on access to official proceedings, NGOs rely on 
informal means - through NGO-organized side events, distribution of materials and 
hallway conversations - to engage diplomats. 
Limitations on participation in the official disarmament proceedings make NGOs 
reliant on the documentary record for a full understanding of developments. The range of 
documents submitted by states for an official UN or Treaty review meeting is wide, 
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including: general statements submitted as official UN documents to be translated and 
given a conference document number; working papers, national reports or thematic 
proposals also provided as official submissions; oral interventions distributed within the 
conference hall only without translation; and printed materials handed out informally 
within the conference halls and without. All official UN documents are available through 
the UN's Official Document System (ODS)58 however meetings that are held in closed 
session typically feature only oral interventions made with simultaneous translation. Such 
statements to an NPT thematic debate, for example, are prepared by the national missions 
to be distributed as hardcopies in the meeting hall by the Secretariat, and are not given 
numbers as official documents to be made accessible via ODS. Both the NPT and CD 
lack an institutional Secretariat or coordinating body, and rely on the Office of 
Disarmament Affairs (formerly the Department of Disarmament Affairs) to provide 
conference services for meetings and maintain the record of proceedings. ODA has relied 
on UN document services to disseminate official documents through its regular channels, 
with no formal library or website.59 
The disarmament NGOs therefore faced the twin access challenges of limited 
participation in multilateral meetings and an incomplete record of proceedings, 
compounding concerns about internal divisions and lack of coordination. The RCW 
project was designed to address these challenges, with central coordination for the large 
international community of NGOs. As the project founder, the WILPF UN office was 
motivated to address a remark by a South African diplomat about poor coordination 
among the disarmament community and observations by other governments that the 
NGOs could be more effective in the NPT context if they were better prepared.60 WILPF 
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was an obvious organization to assume the coordinating role because it had a long record 
of involvement on the disarmament agenda, good connections with a wide range of 
NGOs, and a presence in both Geneva and New York. The initial project proposal was of 
interest to a primary funder to meet the modest start-up budget.61 The project was 
launched in 1999 as a six-month initiative around the 2000 NPT RevCon with a mandate 
to increase the quantity and quality of NGO participation in the disarmament regime. For 
the RevCon RCW prepared and disseminated orientation and briefing materials, 
including a video, for the international NGO community; compiled its first website; 
published a daily newsletter; held press conferences; and coordinated the joint NGO 
presentations to the plenary. 
Facilitation of the NGO presence at the 2000 RevCon was RCW's first activity, 
however it was the website and collection of documents and background information it 
prepared for the occasion that was the legacy of the conference. The Office of 
Disarmament Affairs did not have the capacity to develop an online library, what was at 
the time a relatively innovative project. RCW's online collection of disarmament 
documentation filled this gap and enabled greater information sharing among the 
concerned public in an area where access and participation continue to be hampered by 
restrictive rules of procedure. The result is a continuously growing resource of 
documentation related to all of the multilateral nuclear disarmament bodies, freely 
available for download. 
In providing the central repository for disarmament related documentation, RCW 
exhibits characteristic attributes of an NGO acting as a norm promoter. Addressing the 
dearth of publicly accessible information in the disarmament regime, and the limitations 
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on NGO access to official proceedings, RCW's services promote the norms of 
transparency and accountability. Transparency is defined by Mitchell (1998: 110) as 
"information regarding the operation and impact of a regime."62 Grigorescu (2007: 627) 
notes that transparency is determined by the ability to access information, not just the 
offering of it, and must be understood as relational, in other words, to whom is the 
institution transparent? This is a useful question in light of the documentary 
transparency of the UN: the UN maintains official records of proceedings and 
documentary records; but while these are in principle 'offered', RCW made them 
'accessible'. In 2000, RCW circumvented official channels to further institutionalize the 
norm of transparency with its new website. By providing free public access to official 
and informal documents related to the various multilateral disarmament bodies, the 
proceedings of the RevCon were in principle more transparent than any previous NPT 
meeting of states parties. 
Promoting transparency is assumed by many NGOs to be a means of ensuring 
state compliance with treaty obligations by 'holding them accountable'. Chayes and 
Handler Chayes (1995: 135) have described transparency's role in promoting treaty 
compliance: 
In the context of international regulation, we mean by transparency the availability and 
accessibility of knowledge and information about (1) the meaning of norms, rules, and procedures 
established by the treaty and practice of the regime, and (2) the policies and activities of parties to 
the treaty and of any central organs of the regime as to matters relevant to treaty compliance and 
regime efficacy. 
Transparency is a normative concept: it is considered a democratic ideal to have 
transparent systems of government and a principle of good governance holds that the 
governed receive information from the government. The accountability of primary 
concern to NGOs is what Robert Keohane (2003: 135) calls 'external accountability' or 
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"accountability to people outside the acting entity, whose lives are affected by it." In the 
multilateral context, NGOs widely promote accountability for state behaviour to the 
citizens of the world. 
These means of promoting accountability by states party to a Treaty toward the 
people affected by it are closely linked with transparency through increased access to 
information. Scholte (2002) notes that NGOs can facilitate increased accountability in the 
global system: 
"Civic groups can monitor the implementation and effects of policies regarding 
global relations and press for corrective measures when the consequences are 
adverse. Civil society bodies can take grievances with the performance of global 
regimes to auditors, ombudspersons, parliaments, courts, and the mass 
media.. .civil society associations can push authorities in global governance to 
take greater public responsibility for their actions and policies."65 
Casting a public eye on developments in the multilateral disarmament fora, RCW seeks 
to promote state accountability for the implementation of obligations called for in the 
Treaty regimes. Documentation is used as a form of monitoring, enhanced by 
independent analysis and reporting, to allow NGOs and therefore the public to track 
progress. States that are not meeting their obligations, whether by inaction or blatant non-
compliance, may be 'shamed' with public scrutiny and negative publicity. 
The opportunity for RCW to become the central documentary library for the 
disarmament sector was created by a combination of situational elements: divisions 
within the disarmament were exacerbated by the results of the 1995 Review and 
Extension Conference; representatives of sympathetic states observed and commented on 
the ineffectiveness of the NGOs, encouraging greater internal coordination; to 
compensate for limited direct access to the disarmament proceeding, NGOs relied on 
incomplete documentary records; there was an obvious programmatic opportunity in the 
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absence of an official disarmament documentation library; and a sympathetic foundation 
was willing to back the initiative. Responding to these developments, WILPF staff 
developed a strategic project to assume a coordinating role, and thus address internal 
NGO dynamics, with information dissemination as part of its wider mandate for 
education and preparation of NGOs in advance of the 2000 RevCon. The resulting web 
resource, namely the library of disarmament documentation has become a key feature in 
the disarmament arena. Consequently, RCW has become an important promoter of the 
norm of transparency in the disarmament sector and continues to push for increased 
accountability for states party to the various Treaties. 
Inside the Tent: NGO Representatives on Official Delegations 
The Landmine Monitor and the RCW projects were developed in response to gaps 
in the respective regimes, with input from sympathetic states, and organizational interests 
in pursuing the project. Multiple factors guided project development and created the 
opportunity for the NGOs to assume these roles. When NGO representatives serve on 
official government delegations, however, state support is directly responsible for 
creating the opening for their participation. Only by invitation and with authorization 
from the government leading the delegation could a non-governmental representative 
acquire the necessary accreditation to join an official delegation. In most cases the 
composition of a government delegation to a UN meeting requires senior, if not 
ministerial approval, and some countries have special procedures when NGO 
representatives are engaged.66 While the direct opportunity for involvement in this 
activity depends on state support, the motivation to involve non-governmental 
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representatives, and thus the 'opportunity' is impacted by other factors. Questions of 
capacity and the politics of support for NGOs will be considered in light of examples of 
non-governmental participation on official delegations from the small arms, nuclear 
disarmament and biological weapons regimes. 
Unlike the previous cases, which were focused on an organization or network 
engaged in a single project, this case features individuals participating on delegations 
from several states parties to a range of multilateral events including Treaty reviews, 
annual meetings of states parties, and in one unique case, on a panel of governmental 
experts. Appendix 4 provides a summary table outlining the cases and listing the 
individuals who were interviewed for this research, all of whom served as non-
governmental representatives on one or more official delegations. Engagement of non-
governmental representatives is observed on delegations in a variety of multilateral fora67 
however the sample cases were selected from the security and disarmament sector, from 
delegations covering meetings for the BTWC, NPT and UN Program of Action on small 
arms and light weapons (UN PoA). While the research is not exhaustive, it includes a 
cross section of major cases in the three regimes.68 From these individual cases, several 
broad trends emerge, which thus shed light on the conditions that have enabled non-
governmental representatives to occupy this position on governmental delegations. 
In terms of opportunity, the cases studied show a variety of avenues by which 
these individuals participated on their respective country's delegation. Certainly the 
majority were personally invited, many of whom have filled the role over numerous years 
including John Simpson, Bill Potter and Ernie Regehr. Canada for many years requested 
that its domestic nuclear disarmament community nominate its preferred representative 
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and invited the recommended individual to join its NPT delegation. In some cases the 
individuals were not invited, but requested of their governments the opportunity to 
participate. The German NGO community used examples from other countries -
especially Canada - in seeking permission for members of its research community to join 
delegations. Una Becker and Gotz Neuneck are colleagues at the Peace Research Institute 
Frankfurt (PRIF) and participants on German BWC and NPT delegations respectively.70 
PRIF lobbied officials requesting that its staff be permitted to join delegations as expert 
advisors, with the expectation that they could benefit professionally from the experience 
of observing the meeting 'from inside the tent'. Similarly, Angela Woodward of New 
Zealand requested - and was welcomed - as a respected expert to advise her government 
as a member of its BTWC delegation. Having been part of the delegation to the 2000 
NPT RevCon, when he was invited to join the Canadian delegation for the first of four 
NPT meetings in the 2005 Review Cycle, Ernie Regehr negotiated his participation in the 
full cycle as an Expert Advisor. Florella Hazeley was nominated on behalf of the NGO 
community in Sierra Leone to join its delegation to the RevCon of the UN PoA, in part 
because of international lobbying by IANSA for affected countries to consider asking 
NGO experts to advise them on this issue. However, even in these where the individuals 
requested to serve on the delegation, the participation was endorsed by the officials 
ultimately responsible for approving the delegation's composition.71 
Across the individual cases examined a range of titles were given to the non-
governmental delegation member, which fall into two broad categories, described as 
advisors or liaisons. The advisor role, seen where individuals were called 'expert 
advisor', 'technical advisor', or 'NGO advisor', describes cases where the individual was 
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engaged with a view to capitalizing on his or her technical expertise and past experience. 
Individuals like Bill Potter and John Simpson have held the advisor role at multiple 
international meetings. Notably, these individuals are academics with doctoral 
credentials, working at institutes with dedicated non-proliferation programs, and are 
considered experts in the field.72 The experts commented that their technical knowledge, 
policy expertise and experience are valued by rotational foreign ministry officials who 
lack the same depth of knowledge on technical issues. An important function of this 
advisor role as observed by John Simpson and Bill Potter is that of providing 
'institutional memory'. As that the procedures of multilateral bodies are not always 
clearly stated or written down, rather are based on precedent, Simpson noted that an 
historical perspective of process is important to active government delegations, and 
experts who have attended several rounds of meetings maintain this procedural 
knowledge.73 
The liaison role, seen with titles including 'NGO liaison' and 'NGO 
representative', implies a slightly different function where the representative bridges the 
gap between government and non-governmental participants in the meeting. This role 
should not be interpreted to mean that the individual is necessarily less knowledgeable in 
the technical aspects, but it does suggest that the government has a different interest in 
the person's participation. Among the tasks for which the liaison is responsible are 
attendance at NGO side events and reporting to other NGOs, both organizations present 
at the meeting and the national NGO community. When meetings enter closed sessions, 
this liaison role can be important for the NGO community, as was evidenced at the 2001 
UN Conference on SALW. NGO members of official delegations, including Ernie 
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Regehr (Canada) and Stein Villumstad (Norway) regularly briefed members of the 
International Action Network on Small Arms about developments inside the meeting hall, 
part of what Villumstad described as his role to be a 'bridge' between the Norwegian 
government and the NGOs.74 Several of the individuals interviewed mentioned that they 
provided regular email updates to NGO counterparts not at the meeting.75 With an NGO 
liaison on the official delegation, the state portrays itself as both in touch with and 
interested in the positions of the NGO community. 
The categorization of advisor or liaison suggests that states may invite a non-
governmental representative to participate on an official delegation for multiple reasons. 
The direct benefits of institutional memory, technical expertise, or interaction with other 
NGOs must be considered within a broader political context. What does it say about a 
state when it invites a member of civil society to sit on an official delegation, with 
privileged access to the policy process and closed-door, state-level negotiations? This 
question is partially answered by considering which states invite NGO participation on 
delegations. While my analysis is not exhaustive of every case in all the security and 
disarmament fora, the sample suggests that there is a group of states that consistently 
engage NGO representatives on delegations. Canada, historically a strong supporter of 
NGOs and champion of NGO access rights at multilateral proceedings,76 regularly 
engages NGO representatives as both experts and liaisons. Other like-minded countries 
including Germany, Norway and New Zealand are supporters of NGO representatives. 
The cases suggest that some states, namely the UK, engage non-governmental experts as 
advisors without the liaison function.77 Others, Kyrgyzstan and Sierra Leone for example, 
benefit from the extra support of an NGO expert. Perhaps even more illuminating is the 
60 
group of states that have few if any examples of non-govemmental delegates: generally 
speaking China, Russia, the US , most middle-Eastern and most Asian states rarely draw 
on non-governmental experts for security and disarmament themed official delegations. 
The public relations aspect of inviting close cooperation with representatives of 
the non-governmental sector, or the so-called 'optics', is another consideration. This 
point was raised by several of the Canadians interviewed, one observing that inviting 
NGOs to be on a delegation "gives Canada a reputation of being open in its attitude to 
civil society and thus perhaps forward-thinking."79 Another expert questioned whether 
having an NGO representative on a delegation might suggest that a risky policy position 
is supported by an informed public through the non-governmental representative.80 In the 
small arms sector a number of states with acute small arms problems including 
Guatemala, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka have had NGO 
representatives from victims groups and gun control coalitions on their official 
delegations, bringing both expertise and representation of the affected population to the 
UN floor. Appendix 5 lists all NGO representatives on delegations to the 2005 Biennial 
Meeting of States to the UN PoA, the 2006 PoA RevCon and its PrepCom. 
Underlying the emergence of non-governmental representatives being engaged as 
technical experts and liaisons with civil society is the increasing 'respectability' of the 
NGO sector. A series of articles in the mid-1990's traced the 'rise of the nonprofit sector' 
and the explosion of NGO activity. Lester Salamon (1994) in his seminal article on the 
emerging NGO sector identified several growth factors at both the micro and macro 
levels including official policies that favoured nonprofit service providers over state-
issued development and social welfare, endowing nonprofits with public validity in aid 
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delivery. Jessica Mathews, in her paper describing growth in the NGO sector as a 'Power 
Shift', noted that "NGOs deliver more official development assistance than the entire UN 
System (excluding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund)" and in many 
countries are delivering services "that faltering governments can no longer manage" 
(1995: 53). She argued that by NGOs bearing responsibility in the delivery of 
development programs and humanitarian assistance, this conferred upon them 
respectability in the international realm.81 Kim Reimann (2002: 59-61) has described a 
'pro-NGO norm' seen in the 1990's with the end of the Cold War. She describes two 
components of this norm: a domestic angle whereby it was important for modern states to 
have a 'flourishing civil society sector", and an international element whereby the UN 
system was seen as promoting 'partnership' with NGOs. The human security discourse 
was a further contributor to the legitimization of NGO contributions to multilateralism in 
the 1990s. The public perception of NGOs as legitimate agents of the public good has 
made them acceptable partners for certain governments and thus facilitated their direct 
engagement in the policy process as members of official delegations. 
The element of opportunity is particularly important in the case of non-
governmental representatives on government delegations, because whether they were 
invited directly, or requested to participate, these individuals have to be approved and 
accredited by their government to acquire the necessary security clearances as delegation 
members. All of the individuals examined had reputations as expert and experienced 
individuals, and were thus considered credible partners on the official delegation. This 
'respectability' was therefore essential in opening the door for their contribution to the 
functioning of an official delegation, but as representatives of NGOs and academic 
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institutions rather than government agencies. 
Political circumstances, organizational motivation, and shortcomings in the 
particular regime created the openings for these NGOs to take on particular roles in the 
various regimes. However, two factors affected their further development once the initial 
opportunity was available. In each case, particular organizational tools had an enormous 
impact on the development of the project, providing the means whereby the NGO was 
able to provide its services in the multilateral regime. These tools will be examined 
carefully in the next chapter. Finally, considering the element of 'institutionalization' 
introduced by the Martins model, external support and institutional ties will be examined 
in the final chapter to demonstrate the sustainability of these initiatives. 
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Chapter 4 ~ NGO Tools of Engagement 
The stereotype of NGO activity sees an army of volunteers writing letters and 
distributing photocopied flyers to campaign for an issue on a shoestring budget. While 
some grassroots organizations do operate this way, others including Amnesty 
International, Oxfam and Greenpeace use sophisticated organizational and business 
models to operate multi-million dollar program budgets, with permanent staff, and 
extensive institutional support. The structure and composition of NGOs impact on the 
scale and nature of their programming and these characteristics vary greatly among the 
cases examined here. Each initiative is dependent on particular organizational tools that 
enable their activity. These cover a wide spectrum, but generally fall into three categories 
including financial, technical, and human resources. A key condition that must be 
considered, therefore, is the financial, technical, and human resources at the disposal of 
each of the NGOs. NGO programming is always dependent on external funding and often 
projects are designed because they are 'fundable'. In each of the Landmine Monitor, 
RCW and NGO expert cases financial resources have to some degree shaped the effort 
and therefore this factor will be considered separately as the underlying enabler of NGO 
activity. The availability and type of resources accessible in each case have significantly 
shaped the scope of the projects and their contributions to the regimes. 
Landmine Monitor: A Network Approach 
The network behind the International Campaign to Ban Landmines was made up 
of some 1200 organizations in over 60 countries at the time the Mine Ban Treaty was 
signed. Representing a diverse array of regions and interests but united in their common 
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call for a ban on antipersonnel mines, the organizations were loosely affiliated through 
the campaign and able to pursue national campaign goals while drawing on the resources 
of the collective to interact at the international level.83 The success of the network model 
in the campaign was replicated with the Landmine Monitor to capitalize on contributions 
from a network of field researchers. Landmine Monitor is run by four ICBL member 
organizations that serve as its editorial board: Human Rights Watch, Handicap 
International, Norwegian People's Aid, and Mines Action Canada. Both independent 
researchers and NGO partners are drawn on to write national updates, working with 
thematic research coordinators and the editorial board to produce the annual report. A 
strong and cohesive research methodology ensures that the contributions from the various 
researchers together produce a coherent annual report. These human and technical 
resources enable the Landmine Monitor to maintain high standards of accuracy and 
reliability, thus serving as the Treaty's primary monitoring mechanism. 
The first issue of the annual report was published in 1999, a year and a half after 
the Ottawa conference, and presented at the First Meeting of States in Maputo, 
Mozambique. The tome weighed in at 1,100 pages and contained information on every 
country in the world, including states not party to the Treaty, addressing all Treaty 
obligations. Described as a 'system', the Landmine Monitor project began with a global 
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reporting network, a central online database and a published annual report. While the 
annual report is its most visible product, the network of researchers around the world is 
its greatest attribute. A 2005 job posting for Landmine Monitor researchers noted that its 
researchers include: "lawyers, doctors, humanitarian aid workers, human rights activists, 
landmine survivors, mine action practitioners, graduate students and anti-landmine 
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campaigners and they are all non-governmental". The network makes use of both 
professional contract researchers and campaigners affiliated with an ICBL member NGO 
such as Handicap International, Mines Action Canada, and Norwegian People's Aid, as 
well as several national campaigns such as the Afghan, Cambodia and Pakistan 
Campaigns to Ban Landmines and the Kenya Coalition Against Landmines.87 For the 
most part, the researchers receive small consultancies for their time and can apply for 
research grants for travel, translation or other related expenses. Network affiliates help to 
maximize the consultancy budget. Between 2000 and 2005, Landmine Monitor engaged 
over 100 researchers from some 90 countries to complete the research for every country 
in the world (See Figure 5). When the project shifted its primary focus to 'mine-affected 
countries' this number dropped slightly, but the network still includes approximately 70 
researchers. 
Figure 5: Landmine Monitor Research Network 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
Subject Countries 
192 
192 
192 
192 
192 
192 
112 mine-affected countries 
126 mine-affected countries and 
regions 
118 mine-affected countries, states-
parties with outstanding obligations, 
non states-parties 
Not yet finalized 
Number of Researchers 
80 
115 from 95 countries 
122 from 95 countries 
115 from 90 countries 
110 from 90 countries 
110 from 93 countries 
77 from 72 countries 
71 from 62 countries 
69 from 57 countries 
62 from 46 countries 
To consolidate the work of such a diverse group of researchers and research 
coordinators into one cohesive report, the Landmine Monitor has developed a 
methodology with common standards of practice to which all researchers are required to 
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adhere. Yet, by its own admission, the greatest weakness of the project is the limitations 
it faces in the collection of accurate data.89 The 1999 issue of the report was described as 
an attempt to "establish a baseline of information from which to measure progress in 
alleviating the landmine crisis" (Executive Summary, 1999: 1). Subsequent reports have 
updated and refined the baseline information, and in the process, the research 
methodology has been strengthened to minimize the research pitfalls of a non-
governmental monitoring network with limitations on the gathering of data. The major 
characteristics of the methodology that have enabled continued improvement of the 
product include: localized data collection, cooperation with states, centralized editorial 
oversight and quality control. A strict publication schedule is demanded by the timeline 
from distribution of the research contracts in November, through to publication in time 
for the annual Meeting of States Parties, or the Review Conference as in 2004, typically 
in the fall.90 
The international research network has already been discussed however it bears 
further reference as a central feature of the research methodology that enables localized 
data collection. Researchers based in the country, or working in the region, develop 
personal contacts and make use of sources in the local language, though in several 
countries including Burma, China and Iran, access challenges persist.91 Landmine 
Monitor relies entirely on publicly accessible information to monitor the Treaty's 
implementation, using open-source information rather than investigative journalism or 
war-zone reporting.92 In order to gather official field information, the researchers 
cooperate with national governments and institutions, when this is feasible, including 
military and health practitioners. An important information-gathering tool is Landmine 
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Monitor's practice of providing governments with a draft of their national entry before 
the report goes to the publisher. This provides an opportunity to gauge reaction and 
gather feedback including correction of facts before final publication. Cooperation with 
local UN offices and humanitarian aid agencies, particularly in affected countries, is 
another important resource for researchers. Further, UN Mine Action Centre and Geneva 
Centre for Mine-Affected both collect in-country data that is accessible online.93 
The research is organized by both country and theme, with four Thematic 
Research Coordinators responsible for Ban Policy, Non-State Armed Groups, Victim 
Assistance and Mine Action respectively.94 The Thematic Research Coordinators work to 
ensure consistency and common reporting methods among the international researchers. 
Final editorial oversight is centralized with one lead agency, previously Human Rights 
Watch and now Mines Action Canada, which bears ultimate responsibility for the 
correctness and completeness of the report. Filtering the independent national reports 
through the Thematic Research Coordinators and finally the editorial team brings 
consistency to the disparate voices that produce the report. The research is also subject to 
a process of peer review at an annual research network conference where the researchers 
and editorial team gather to discuss major findings and address outstanding questions. In 
the past, the conference has featured workshops and training in research methods, to 
strengthen the skills of the research network.95 
Quality control is consistently a concern for the project. Since its creation, 
researchers have been required to find corroborating evidence for pieces of information to 
verify such facts as the kind of mine used to ensure it was an AP mine, the nature of 
injuries received, and whether this was a new incidence of mine usage, before including 
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the incident in the annual report. The Thematic Research Coordinators perform an 
additional fact-check of all draft country reports, and the editorial team has final 
responsibility for ensuring the veracity of the report's contents. A "Research" page on the 
Landmine Monitor website, at http://www.icbl.orig/lm/research, is maintained by the lead 
agency to coordinate the research methodology for the international network. Sections 
including the Production Schedule, Key Reference Documents and Links, and the 
Thematic Guidelines and Questionnaires feature essential web-based content for the 
researchers. For each thematic area, a document outlining information sources and key 
research areas, with instructions and research requirements for each, is provided, as well 
as an orientation guide.96 These documents provide tips for what information should be 
reported, how to update the previous year's report, and how data can be gathered, for 
example: 
III) Antipersonnel Mine Use 
In your first draft, cite all allegations of antipersonnel mine use from any source or actor, even if 
the allegation does not seem credible. Note if nothing new has happened in the reporting period. 
Describe any confirmed or suspected recent mine use by your government or within your country 
in as much detail as possible with several, varied sources for this information. Use open sources 
such as media reports or try interviews. Do not put yourself at risk during this research. If you 
know of something, but don't wish to include it in the report communicate direct with us.97 
The website acts as a quality control mechanism, providing ready access to clear 
instructions, necessary online resources and contact information. 
NGOs were at the forefront of the effort to ban antipersonnel landmines, and it is 
therefore logical that they remain engaged to monitor implementation of the Mine Ban 
Treaty. During the landmine campaign, the concern was with grafting an existing norm -
the taboo of certain indiscriminate means of warfare - on what was at the time an 
acceptable military device - AP mines.98 With Landmine Monitor, the same NGOs who 
acted as 'moral entrepreneurs' in their advocacy for a landmine ban, are institutionalizing 
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the nascent norm of the mine ban. The NGO network monitors changes in state policy 
and practice over successive years and publicizes developments through the annual 
report, creating a record of state accountability with the Treaty. States that have 
implemented the measures called for in the Treaty, or with no remaining landmines, are 
removed from the report in an acknowledgement of success, while cases of non-
compliance are recognized and admonished. These monitoring functions, including the 
public shaming of non-compliance and the tracking of trends over time, thus strengthen 
the landmines taboo. In order to fulfill this task with credibility, the Monitor employs 
field-based researchers and seeks to ensure consistent and reliable reporting through its 
research methodology and editorial structure. These tools have enabled Landmine 
Monitor to become the de facto monitoring system for the Mine Ban Treaty. 
Reaching Critical Will: Maximizing its Reach through the Internet 
Unlike the Landmine Monitor, which draws on an international network of 
researchers and partner organizations to monitor implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, 
Reaching Critical Will has a single full-time staff member working at WILPF's New 
York office, with supplementary assistance from interns and WILPF's Geneva office. 
Run on a limited budget, RCW depends enormously on electronic tools to manage and 
execute its project. The vast majority of its program is implemented online through its 
website at www.reachingcriticalwill.org. With minimal human and financial resources, 
RCW's program has an international reach to other NGOs, the broader public, as well as 
officials and diplomats through its website and thus technical resources are the major tool 
supporting RCW's role as a documentary resource. 
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Reaching Critical Will was founded by one of the oldest disarmament NGOs, the 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Although the project itself has a 
small staff, the institutional support of WILPF and its international affiliates must be 
acknowledged. RCW is an expansion of WILPF's historical activism on the disarmament 
agenda and is supported by its international constituency. The Program Associate that 
runs RCW is a dedicated staff person, specialized in the disarmament agenda with a 
primary focus on nuclear disarmament. The majority of RCW's program associates over 
the years have possessed academic backgrounds in peace and disarmament studies, and 
several rose through the WILPF internship program." Typically quite young, there has 
been regular turnover of the project associates, attributable to the demands of the job and 
its modest compensation.100 In spite of their relative inexperience, however, program 
associates and interns are immersed in the disarmament agenda and quickly develop issue 
expertise. 
Arguably, RCW is a product of the information technology revolution, 
compensating for its small staff with modern electronic resources. It is only made 
possible in its current manifestation by technological tools including laptop computers, 
document scanners, the internet and e-mail. All of the staff members interviewed for this 
research attested to the value of electronic tools for the project, noting that the work 
would not be possible without modern information technology. The costs of staffing, 
hard-copy publishing, postage and even office space are minimized because RCW has 
built a centralized electronic nucleus. Further technological innovations even over the 
past eight years have improved the ability of RCW to deliver its services in near real-
time.101 Yet its website maintains a relatively simple design, is easily navigable and well 
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organized and only once has it been significantly redesigned since the project's 
inception.102 
Craig Warkentin (2001) has described six ways in which NGOs use the internet: 
"facilitating internal communication; shaping public perceptions; enhancing member 
services; disseminating informational resources; encouraging political participation; and 
realizing innovative ideas." While he acknowledges that the first two purposes are 
common, others are emphasized variably by different NGOs consistent with their 
program objectives. RCW employs the internet for all of these purposes, with a 
particular emphasis on the latter four (See Figure 6). In its capacity as coordinator for the 
disarmament community, RCW's website enhances member services by providing 
information about NGO registration for multilateral meetings, a calendar of events, and 
general background information. The series of newsletters produced by RCW - daily 
during NPT meetings, weekly during the UNGA 1st Committee and the CD, with periodic 
organizational updates - for information dissemination are sent by email and linked to the 
site. These newsletters and occasional action notices regularly call on the NGO 
community to respond domestically to political developments and the website features a 
database of diplomatic contact information. Finally, in terms of'realizing innovative 
ideas', RCW's creation of a central document repository for the major multilateral 
disarmament events draws a wider audience than the target NGO audience, introducing 
diplomats, officials, academics and the wider public to the site. Without the internet, 
clearly the RCW project would not be of the same scale or reach the audience that it is 
able to currently. 
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Figure 6: Reaching Critical Will's Web-based Resources 
Resource 
Newsletters (General E-
News, CD Report, News in 
Review, First Committee 
Monitor) 
Government Contact 
Database (NY missions, UN 
Security Council members, 
CD members) 
NGO Contact Database 
Disarmament Treaty Texts 
Disarmament Calendar 
Fact sheets and 
backgrounders 
Published Reports 
Disarmament 
documentation 
Format 
Email distribution, linked to 
website 
Posted on website with 
links to government sites as 
available 
Posted on website with 
email contacts 
Linked externally or posted 
on website 
Posted on website with 
email contacts 
PDF texts on website 
PDF texts on website 
PDF texts on website 
Purpose 
Disseminating information, 
encouraging political 
participation 
Encouraging political 
participation 
Enhancing member services 
Disseminating information 
Encouraging political 
participation; enhancing 
member services 
Disseminating information 
Disseminating information 
Realizing innovative ideas -
disarmament library to 
increase transparency 
In the nuclear disarmament context, the norm of transparency is regularly 
referenced as a confidence-building measure with regard to Treaty implementation.10 
States parties call for the nuclear-weapon states to make 'transparent' reductions of 
nuclear forces or hold 'transparent' policies of no first-use, weapons test bans, and 
assurances of non-use against non-nuclear weapons states. RCW has become a promoter 
of this norm through its effort to bring into the public eye the documentary record of the 
disarmament Treaties and negotiating bodies. While arguably a hard-copy collection of 
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documents could serve the same general purpose, it is the complete and near real-time 
posting of documents online that allows an international audience to monitor the 
multilateral proceedings. This unofficial record is more comprehensive than any other 
UN source and the only centralized repository of disarmament-related documents. 
Cornelia Beyer (2007: 525) notes that "transparency through information is 
understood to be central for the creation and exertion of public control and thus to be of 
importance for democratization" and traces a line from increased information flow and 
transparency to the public's ability to form opinion and thus participate in the political 
process. RCW seeks to strengthen the norm of transparency by ensuring free, public 
access to information and official documents, through which the community of advocates 
and activists can pursue its objectives in an informed manner. The norm of transparency 
is linked - by both states and NGOs - with the principle of state accountability for 
compliance with multilateral obligations. In enhancing transparency at the multilateral 
level, RCW is enabling increased public engagement in the political process around 
disarmament diplomacy, and thus drawing attention to the actions of states with an 
interest to promoting accountability. This pursuit of transparency, and RCW's creation of 
a library for the disarmament regime, is only made possible by its extensive use of 
economical and far-reaching electronic tools. 
NGO Representatives: Speaking with Authority 
The human and technical resources that have enabled the Landmine Monitor and 
RCW projects to provide essential services to the landmines and nuclear sectors correlate 
very closely with the nature of the projects. As a treaty monitoring system, Landmine 
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Monitor relies on its international network of researchers, whose work is united through a 
solid research strategy. With a modest staff and budget, RCW capitalizes on electronic 
means to deliver its services economically to a wide audience. Similarly, the individual 
non-governmental representatives who participate on official delegations have certain 
resources at their disposal. Best categorized as human resources, these qualities include 
an institutional affiliation as a non-governmental member of civil society and individual 
expertise on the issue. These attributes establish the individual's authority to act in the 
capacity of a non-governmental representative on an official delegation. 
Whether the non-governmental representative fills the role as advisor or liaison, 
all of the individuals interviewed for this research demonstrate a high level of issue 
expertise. Some are widely published academics with expertise on the technical and 
political issues in their respective fields including Una Becker, John Simpson, Bill Potter 
and Gotz Neuneck. Other practitioners have a combination of academic and program 
experience including Angela Woodward of VERTIC, Ernie Regehr of Project 
Ploughshares and Stein Villumstad, previously with Norwegian Church Aid. All of these 
individuals have been expert advisors to their governments and all felt that their personal 
expertise was a major reason they were selected to perform this function. 
Technical knowledge is that much more important for states that lack domestic 
government expertise on technically demanding subjects. The case of Bill Potter is 
perhaps the most unique among the sample cases in that he is an American academic who 
serves as Technical Advisor to the government of Kyrgyzstan for NPT meetings. Dr. 
Potter was invited to join the delegation early in Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet history when it 
lacked experienced diplomats to cover the NPT and needed external support.105 Since 
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1994 he has served on delegations to every NPT PrepCom and RevCon and provided 
direct input into the drafting of Kyrgyz national interventions. Incapacity among 
government delegations may also be a result of the short-terms served by diplomats on 
any one issue, an institutional memory gap John Simpson viewed to be filled by his 
advisory role on the UK NPT delegation. 
In contrast, the individuals who have played the role of NGO liaison are more 
likely to have personal or field experience in the area, or work in a particularly affected 
region. For example, Florella Hazeley of Sierra Leone is both a survivor of her country's 
civil war and an educator about the dangers of small arms and light weapons through her 
organization, the Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms (SLANSA). Similarly, 
Ochieng Adala is a policy practitioner working on small arms issues in the Horn of 
Africa and as a former member of the Kenyan government, is uniquely qualified to sit as 
an NGO representative on his government's delegation to the Biennial Meeting of States 
Parties and RevCon of the UN PoA on small arms and light weapons. Bev Delong is the 
Chairperson of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons with some 25 years 
of advocacy and activist experience on the nuclear agenda. Her grassroots experience has 
been important in her role as NGO liaison on Canadian delegations to the NPT reporting 
to the domestic NGO community. These individuals also felt that their personal 
experience and professional credentials were the primary reason they were invited to 
serve on a delegation. Expertise and experience lend respectability to an individual when 
a government considers inviting his or her participation on a delegation. 
The other common attribute among the non-governmental representatives 
interviewed is their institutional affiliation. They represent a range of academic, research, 
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and non-govemmental organizations but all are established civil society organizations. 
Organizational affiliation qualifies the individuals as representatives of civil society and 
denotes a certain authority - real or perceived - to speak on the subject. For example, 
representing an organization active in public education and campaigning on the impact of 
small arms on civilians in Sierra Leone, Florella Hazeley advises her government from an 
NGO perspective. Similarly, as Executive Director of a major NGO involved in 
verification research, Angela Woodward is a respected authority on biological weapons 
serving as advisor to New Zealand. Both of these women come from small countries with 
relatively few experts on a given issue and are respected because of their accomplished 
careers. The academics involved primarily in the NPT context as expert advisors have 
personal credentials on the issue, affiliated with distinguished academic research 
institutions with specialized programs on disarmament and non-proliferation. Coupled 
with an overall increase in NGO respectability, and personal expertise, the specific 
credentials of the organizations represented in these cases suggest that institutional 
affiliation provides certain credibility to the delegation member.106 
Richard Price, in his review article on transnational civil society, examined the 
concepts of civil society authority and legitimacy. His observation (cited above) that 
"Transnational activists derive their authority from three principal sources: expertise, 
moral influence, and a claim to political legitimacy" is worth re-visiting in consideration 
of the means by which individuals assume the role of a non-governmental member of an 
official delegation. In the cases studied, the individuals were qualified to participate on 
delegations because of particular credentials, namely personal expertise and institutional 
affiliation, attributes that embody the sources of 'authority' identified by Price. Technical 
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expertise - either academic or practice-based - is critical when NGO representatives fill 
an advisory role, seen most among western countries with non-governmental advisors. 
Moral authority - or personal experience at the grassroots level or in an affected area - is 
observed particularly in cases where the individual is an NGO representative with a 
liaison function. And political legitimacy is a result of affiliation with a recognized, and 
respected, NGO or institution deemed to be authoritative on the issue. Of these, political 
legitimacy is most contested and will be examined further. 
Non-governmental representatives serving on official delegations can be 
understood as representatives of an epistemic community, consistent with Peter Haas' 
definition (1992: 3) of "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area."107 Haas assumes that states face uncertainty 
about policy decisions, which stimulates the need for information, and epistemic 
communities are a possible source of information and advice, particularly on technical 
and scientific questions. Non-governmental experts such as the individuals examined 
here demonstrate the function of an epistemic community: as independent experts on 
technical issues with shared beliefs and a principled approach, they are invited to 
participate on official delegations to provide informed advice on policy questions to the 
state party. While possessing a perceived authority on the issue was critical in every 
incidence before the non-governmental representative was engaged as an official delegate 
by a government, it can be assumed that serving in this capacity also further enhanced the 
individual's reputation as an expert. The authority of the epistemic community 
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representative is underlined by both the political legitimacy resulting from affiliation with 
a recognized organization and personal expertise. 
The Costs: Financial Resources for NGO Initiatives 
Technical and human resources vary among the different cases because each has a 
distinct project objective and set of activities which require unique tools. At first glance 
there is very little commonality across the three cases with regard to financial resources. 
Landmine Monitor operates on a $1.6 million dollar budget with extensive government 
support; Reaching Critical Will has a very limited budget supplemented by voluntary 
contributions from interns and partner organizations; and the individuals serving as 
representatives on official delegations come from organizations and academic institutions 
with various forms of financial backing. There are, however, two aspects of financial 
support that are worth considering across the three cases: the scale and stability of 
funding for the initiatives. Sustainable NGO programming requires both sufficient and 
reliable financial resources, which is something these initiatives have in common. 
Comparing the scale of a project with an international monitoring network and 
thousand page published report, to one with a mostly web-based resource, or an 
individual's short-term but intensive commitment on a delegation, it is concluded that 
above all, funding must be commensurate with the scale of a project. NGOs design 
projects to target the possible funding sources at their disposal and the scale of a project 
is typically determined by the availability of resources. In spite of the variance in the kind 
of funding evident in each of the three cases, all have support that meets the scale of 
planned activities. 
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Inspired in part by supportive governments to capitalize on a strong NGO network 
and develop the primary mechanism to verify the Mine Ban Treaty, Landmine Monitor 
was designed to have a dedicated staff, extensive field research, a published annual 
report, as well as a high-quality website. Its current budget of $1.6 million reflects this 
and is in fact very economical considering the cost of other official treaty monitoring 
schemes.108 In contrast, Reaching Critical Will was designed by an organization with 
strong grassroots ties and had modest initial objectives within a $30,000 budget 
constrained to a single multilateral meeting. RCW is still a very low-cost project with an 
annual budget in the area of $70,000 made possible by it capitalizing on its web-based 
resources and intern program.10 The funding support for NGO representatives on official 
delegations is a somewhat different question, but it is only with both a regular salary and 
support for additional travel expenses that these individuals can accept invitations to 
participate on government delegations. Very few are paid for the time they are required to 
spend away from their regular employment and therefore without institutional support, 
could not attend the international meetings.110 While in some cases, the government funds 
the travel expenses of its NGO representative, in others, the individual bears the cost 
personally, or finds external support for travel.111 In the three cases, program expectations 
and budget scale are consistent; however fundraising remains a struggle and 
preoccupation, particularly for the staff of the project cases. 
Acquiring start-up funding for project activities and maintaining sustainable 
sources of funding are somewhat distinct challenges. These efforts to monitor treaty 
implementation or maintain the documentary record of multilateral proceedings are not 
one-off projects, but are efforts that could theoretically go on in perpetuity. As such, 
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some funders are hesitant to commit funds for such projects, or may make start-up 
funding conditional on the project finding sustainable means to continue after year one.112 
The necessity of ensuring sustainable funding, particularly for the project cases, is clear. 
Landmine Monitor was designed in cooperation with governments and thus had 
reasonable assurances of long-term government funding from the outset (See Figure 7). 
However, it is a continual straggle for staff to raise the necessary budget from year to 
year, compounded in that few governments can provide multi-year funding, each state 
has a different fiscal year, and the burden of reporting on government funding continues 
to grow. While the Landmine Monitor has retained a relatively stable budget since 
2005, the annual report is its major cost and activities such as the international research 
network conference are held when funding permits.114 RCW was designed as a short-term 
project to coincide with the 2000 NPT RevCon on a pledge of one-time support from a 
US foundation. Transposing the project plan into a long-term program with a parallel 
funding scheme was a challenge and project managers struggled to acquire sustainable 
foundation support in the early years.115 RCW shifted its focus somewhat to pursue 
governmental funding, with some limited success, but is still primarily dependent on the 
small number of foundations interested in multilateral disarmament work. In spite of the 
challenges to secure multi-year funding, manage the changing interests of donors, and 
fulfill the major reporting requirements, both projects have sustained adequate funding 
for the priority activities over multiple years. 
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Figure 7: Government Funders of Landmine Monitor116 
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NGO activity of all sorts is dependent on external financial support from 
individual donors, foundations and government agencies. The common tool that acts as 
an enabler for the three cases studied here is financial support that is both sufficient and 
sustainable to meet ongoing program needs. Beyond financial support, the projects rely 
on different technical and human resources consistent with the scale and objectives of the 
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initiatives. Capitalizing on the connections built during the Landmine Ban Campaign, 
with a developed research methodology to establish common practice amongst its diverse 
network, Landmine Monitor has developed an unparalleled monitoring system for a 
fraction of the cost of an official state-run Treaty verification program. RCW has 
employed information technology in innovative and far-reaching ways to become the 
authoritative documentary resource for the disarmament regime with only one full-time 
staff person. Individuals, with both expertise and organizational affiliation, serve as non-
governmental representatives on official delegations fulfilling both advisory and liaison 
functions. The tools that enable the various initiatives reflect the structure and objectives 
of the initiative. 
Opportunity - a combination of timing, inclination and political circumstances -
as well as organizational structure and tools together enable NGOs to pursue initiatives 
that have the potential to become complementary and critical to official processes. But 
sustaining a project such that it essential to the particular regime requires institutional 
support. In addition to the sustained funding discussed above, support from various 
external actors is essential in defining these projects and distinguishing them from typical 
NGO activities. Each of the case studies is characterized by some level of 
institutionalization directed at state governments, the broader UN system or a 
combination of the two. 
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Chapter 5: Making the Connection: Institutional 
Support 
The level of engagement in the state-based system observed in these cases is 
rarely, if ever, the result of a one-time initiative or single attempt at political 
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involvement. Rather, in all of the initiatives a long-term programmatic commitment is 
observed. To sustain their projects and acquire essential resources, NGOs develop 
important institutional links with governments, funders and UN organizations. This 
institutional support results when relationships with key actors are fostered over time to 
assist in project implementation. In the manner of Kerstin Martens' model, a number of 
variables will be examined to assess institutionalization, including the nature of 
interaction with the UN system; organizational professionalism; donor relations; and 
cooperation with government officials. This area is arguably that which differentiates 
more typical, one-time NGO initiatives from the cases here, in that it is only with strong 
institutional support that NGOs can build upon opportunity and their own capacity to 
develop and sustain projects that complement official processes. 
Landmine Monitor's Contacts in the Field 
The scale and scope of the Landmine Monitor project require that it have strong 
institutional relationships at multiple levels. Field researchers depend on close 
cooperation with UN field offices and specialized agencies for data and corroboration of 
information. Connections with national militaries, the media, and international 
organizations, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross, continue to be 
important for the project long after the successful networking of the landmine campaign. 
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Landmine Monitor has, however, established the closest institutional relationship with 
those governments it is monitoring.118 It has pursued a range of avenues to engage with 
governments, ensuring the support of both sympathetic and opposing states for the 
Monitor's work. 
Understandably, governments were somewhat skeptical of the Landmine Monitor 
effort in its early iterations and were reticent to cooperate with the NGO researchers. But 
because the annual report uses only publicly available information, cooperation with 
officials was deemed important to enable researchers to get comprehensive and factual 
information. The project therefore emphasized outreach and sought every possible 
opportunity to engage with both states-party and those not party to the Treaty to both 
'sell' the Monitor and acquire information. The Treaty itself provides occasions for 
informal interaction with officials including at the intersessional standing committees and 
meetings of states parties, which editorial staff attend in order to meet and interview 
officials. Landmine Monitor has pursued other informal and indirect means to develop 
government contacts and promote its work including at various multilateral and regional 
meetings with presentations to ASEAN, the Francophonie, NATO and the 
Commonwealth. At national mine-destruction events, researchers meet with military 
officials, take photographs for the annual report, and document mine destruction. ICBL 
events, including regional meetings and annual report launches, provide occasions to 
invite government participation and further engage states. Landmine Monitor seeks to 
engage with states on the contents of the report and posts correspondence from 
governments on its website in the interest of transparency.119 
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As systematic civil society monitoring of a treaty was new to the security and 
disarmament sector, there was widespread expectation that Landmine Monitor would be 
politically charged.12 In order to avoid this, Landmine Monitor sought to employ an 
even-handed approach from the outset. Although at risk of showing a bias toward its key 
supporting states, including Norway, Canada, Belgium and Austria, the editors sought to 
balance each state's record against its obligations and circumstances. In adopting this 
approach, most states directly implicated in the Mine Ban Treaty - as producers of 
landmines or affected countries - were called to task in the early reports.121 Deliberate 
outreach and interaction, coupled with Landmine Monitor's early emphasis on objective 
reporting, were essential to build credibility as a reliable account of state compliance 
among all states party. In time, even those states that were not in compliance with, or 
have not signed the Treaty, began cooperating with researchers.122 For example, although 
the US vehemently opposes the Treaty, refusing to sign and give up its right to possess 
landmines, it cooperates very closely in the provision of information for the annual 
report.123 
Cooperating with the governments that it is monitoring has facilitated Landmine 
Monitor's ability to access and verify open source information for the annual report. 
Central to the Monitor's research methodology is state review of the draft national reports 
before publication. Government feedback in response to these reviews has occasionally 
had a significant impact on the final research. In a 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor, 
Australia corrected the statement that it had never produced landmines, noting that 
production had ceased in the 1980's.124 Reported in the 2003 annual report, (2003: 652) 
Nepalese government officials admitted to use of landmines to Landmine Monitor for the 
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first time in 2002, and an Army Official subsequently reported that Nepal had once 
produced landmines, thus correcting statements in previous annual reports. While there is 
a risk of real, or perceived, compromise due to close cooperation states, over time, the 
Monitor is building a reputation for credibility, reliability and objectivity. 
Like its interaction with states, Landmine Monitor's relationship with the UN is 
not confined to the traditional avenues for NGO engagement with UN bodies, but is 
interactive and essential to the research program. ECOSOC accreditation is not required 
for NGO access to meetings of states party to the Landmine Convention, and the ICBL 
has observer status in the Treaty regime. The ICBL has a presence in Geneva, with an 
office of six staff, to coordinate participation in regular intersessional meetings and 
meetings of states parties that are commonly held there.125 The lead agencies for 
Landmine Monitor are based in Belgium, Canada, Norway and the United States, with 
staff in affected regions. Landmine Monitor makes use of several channels to interact 
with the UN, not limited to formal diplomatic meetings. In affected countries, Landmine 
Monitor researchers cooperate with UN Mine Action Centres, which often have technical 
expertise and provide a forum for inter-agency consultation on mine-related issues. UN 
field offices provide a means to acquire and verify information that might not otherwise 
be reported, including from migrants and refugees. The official data collected by the UN, 
primarily through the UN Mine Action Service, is an essential tool for completion of the 
annual report. 
In addition to the research resources of its agencies, the UN also provides political 
support for the landmine issue broadly by way of relevant agencies and the Secretary 
General. In the context of the human security debate and human rights and development 
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implications of the issue, landmines have provided a political focal point for several UN 
agencies. UNDP identifies with the development challenges in landmine-affected 
countries, advocating around the issue and supporting Landmine Monitor's work 
financially. UNICEF is concerned with landmines because children are a disproportionate 
percentage of their victims and is also a project funder. Both agencies fund landmines-
related field work and are politically supportive of the work of the ICBL.126 The 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations has a dedicated Mine Action Service that works 
in post-conflict situations doing mine-action, a key information resource. Policy guidance 
for the UN's approach to landmines is provided in "The United Nations Inter-Agency 
Mine Action Strategy 2006-2011", which links mine action strategy with overarching UN 
policy, stressing the Millennium Development Goals.127 The annual landmine appeals of 
the UN Secretary General on the occasion of the April 4th International Day for Mine 
Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, are important for maintaining public attention 
on the issue. This political support for landmines and engagement with the UN more 
generally translates into valuable information resources, financial support and political 
capital for Landmine Monitor. 
Landmine Monitor has nurtured its connections with national governments, 
international diplomats, UN field offices, and specialized UN agencies over nine years of 
operation. An asset to its ability to build and maintain these relationships is the core of 
long-term dedicated staff that remains involved in the project. Among these, Steve Goose 
and Paul Harmon, the former and current editors, have been part of Landmine Monitor 
since its creation, as has Mary Wareham formerly of the Human Rights Watch editorial 
team and now a researcher. Among the research network there are several additional 'old 
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hands': in a comparison of the contributors to the annual report of past years and the 
contact list for 2008, nearly half of the researchers for 2008 were involved in 2005 and of 
these about a dozen were also involved in 2001. Continuity in the team of researchers and 
editors facilitates informal interaction with officials and other institutional sources. 
In 1999, as an NGO project designed to promote the new mine ban norm through 
institutionalization of the monitoring and accountability provisions of the Treaty, 
Landmine Monitor was viewed by some as the new frontier for NGO engagement in 
international politics. It was a continuation of the partnership between government and 
NGOs built during the landmine campaign, autonomous but reliant on government 
funding. Though Landmine Monitor has independently monitored implementation of the 
Landmine Monitor in its nine comprehensive annual reports to date, it has relied on 
cooperation with states and the UN for funding, access to information and political 
endorsement. The approach for each state differs and thus Landmine Monitor 
diversifies its outreach strategy accordingly. Informal interaction with officials and 
information exchange with other agencies is essential, rather than consultation through 
formal diplomatic channels. In working so closely with governments and institutions, 
Landmine Monitor has developed its position as the Treaty's monitoring system on 
behalf of states parties in lieu of a formal verification mechanism. 
RCW: Cooperating with the Bureaucrats 
Reaching Critical Will is a project of WILPF - a decentralized, international 
NGO whose members are international affiliates represented by a General Secretariat. 
WILPF maintains a small full-time staff, of which one Project Associate is exclusively 
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responsible for RCW. The small size of RCW necessitates wide use of electronic tools to 
develop its resources and maximize its reach. Similarly, RCW is dependent on external 
support to implement its program and exploit its resources. RCW capitalizes on its 
proximity to the UN to foster relationships with government officials and UN 
bureaucrats, relationships that have facilitated access to information and documents. Staff 
cultivate relationships with several foundations interested in arms control and 
disarmament issues, to meet funding goals. As a small project of a federative NGO, RCW 
prioritizes institutional relationships, and is supported by key actors in the multilateral 
system. 
RCW operates from the small WILPF UN Office located directly across the street 
from UN Headquarters in New York. Some activities, including the regular monitoring of 
the Conference on Disarmament, which is based at the UN Office in Geneva, are 
supported by WILPF's international secretariat headquarters in Geneva. From these 
strategic locations RCW staff frequent the halls of the UN to attend relevant meetings of 
states and cover events within their purview. Proximity to the two UN headquarters is 
essential for RCW's work, enabling staff to be present at all major disarmament meetings 
as well as the range of side events and conferences centered at the UN. Further, the 
resources and support of the RCW offices are literally steps away from the proceedings in 
the UN building, which facilitates day to day operations and prompt postings to the 
website as new documents are made available. 
WILPF, and thus by proxy RCW, is one of the oldest ECOSOC accredited 
disarmament NGOs. As such, its staff members carry UN grounds passes, which provide 
access to the conference and meeting rooms of the UN buildings in Geneva and New 
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York.130 ECOSOC accreditation, and its accompanying privileges, is particularly useful 
for participation in meetings of regular standing bodies such as the CD. The CD has no 
special conference accommodations for NGOs that are not accredited with the UN, 
although ECOSOC accredited NGOs can sit in the gallery and observe.131 With ECOSOC 
accreditation, NGOs are also entitled to make use of UN press and communications tools 
through the Department of Public Information and acquire hardcopies of documents. This 
formal relationship with the UN through ECOSOC also imbues WILPF, and thus RCW, 
with a certain degree of credibility as all accreditations are endorsed by the ECOSOC 
states parties through the membership committee. 
The founder of RCW, Felicity Hill, noted that WILPF has always prioritized its 
relationship with officials at the Office of Disarmament Affairs, "because diplomats go, 
but the bureaucrats stay". RCW has regular interaction with the ODA staff that have 
coordinating responsibility for disarmament events, cooperation that is important for the 
acquisition of documents and the provision of coordination services to the wider NGO 
community. Because ODA did not have the capacity to build a document library in 
anticipation of the 2000 NPT RevCon, the RCW staff copied official documents at the 
UN library and posted them online for the first time.132 The UN now maintains websites 
with complete coverage for all major conferences, but in 2000 when RCW first created 
its online library of disarmament documentation the then-DD A did not have the time, 
web-presence or even bandwidth to build such a resource. One former program associate 
noted that "perhaps nobody is as grateful for RCW as the ODA" because RCW serves as 
the liaison with the NGO community and lessens the administrative burden by taking on 
certain coordination tasks. The relationship is described as a "two-way street" such that 
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RCW has provided welcome services, and thus has received reciprocal assistance when it 
was required. 
Access to the UN also enables RCW staff to interact with diplomats and build 
informal relationships with government officials. Several of the program associates noted 
that this interaction facilitated their work of collecting documents, particularly hard-copy 
informal interventions. As early as the 2000 RevCon, RCW's newsletters provided an 
opening to interact with government officials. The "News in Review" is now distributed 
in hard copy at the door of the meeting hall every morning during the NPT and is widely 
read by diplomats seeking a snapshot summary on the proceedings.134 As the physical 
products of RCW's work - daily newsletters and the document library - have become 
recognized and appreciated by officials, so has the willingness to share statements. One 
program associate recounted that even governments that disagree with RCW's positions 
provide insights and information to support the reporting effort, seeking to have their 
approach reflected fairly in the widely read newsletters. While initially acquiring 
informal statements was difficult, now many governments provide RCW with electronic 
files of their interventions immediately after they are issued, and some provide a delivery 
copy of statements not distributed in the meeting room.135 Through these channels of 
interaction, RCW has built relationships with diplomats and officials that aid the 
collection of documents and flow of information and have become a source of funding 
from a handful of governments. 
In its effort to promote transparency and accountability within the multilateral 
disarmament regime, RCW has established a series of resources to educate and inform. 
Developing its library of documentation has required that RCW staff cooperate with UN 
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officials and interact with states parties. As a small project with minimal resources, RCW 
prioritizes institutional relationships that it has built through formal channels of UN-NGO 
interaction. At the same time, its narrow focus, ECOSOC status, modest budget and close 
proximity to multilateral activities enable RCW to provide its documentary services 
while retaining its identity as an independent NGO. Only a small percentage of RCW s 
budget is funded by states, and thus it is not likely to compromise its principled positions 
to ensure funding. It provides an essential service as a reliable source for disarmament 
documentation and reporting, but is at liberty to take critical positions. Interaction with 
bureaucrats and diplomats enables staff to keep abreast of developments to provide 
informed reporting, but RCW maintains its independence as part of a grassroots, 
women's organization. 
Speaking on their Behalf 
Non-governmental members of official delegations, by definition, demonstrate 
close interaction with their governments, working hand-in-hand on the particular issue. In 
most of the examples, the individuals are given the opportunity to comment on draft 
statements, actively participate in daily delegation briefings, attend bilateral and side 
meetings with other delegations, and wear the red UN security badge of a government 
official.136 While the two project cases show interaction with UN and government 
officials for information, financial and political support, the fate of the projects is 
dependent on the organizations responsible for their operation. In the case of individual 
experts, the government may be asked to include a non-governmental representative on 
an official delegation, but ultimately the decision lies with officials. In this way, the 
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institutional relationship seen in the third case is overwhelmingly directed toward 
government not the UN. 
A high level of interaction between the non-governmental experts and the 
officials working on the delegations was observed in all of the examples. The majority of 
the advisors and liaisons attended daily briefings and provided input into national 
positions. Una Becker and Ernie Regehr were each tasked with drafting national working 
papers, which were ultimately submitted to the respective BWC and NPT meetings as 
official conference documents by their governments. John Simpson occasionally attends 
group and bilateral meetings on the perimeter of the NPT to represent the UK delegation. 
Typically the non-governmental experts stay at the same hotel as the other delegation 
members and socialize outside of official activities.137 The integration is cause for 
confusion at times: Angela Woodward noted that her organizational affiliation with 
VERTIC was well known and therefore her presence in closed meetings caused some 
confusion at the 2006 BWC RevCon. Though rare, incidents where NGO representatives 
actually speak on behalf of governments, demonstrate the highest level of institutional 
interaction. Ernie Regehr's participation on the Group of Government Experts on Arms 
Transfer Transparency is an interesting example of this. 
UN General Assembly Resolution 43/75 of 1988 called for establishment of a 
Group of Government Experts to study the Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency 
in International Transfers of Conventional Arms in the interest of enhancing arms trade 
transparency. Between January 1990 and July 1991 the Group of Experts met four times 
to prepare its final report, which was transmitted to the General Assembly as Resolution 
A/46/301 of 9 September 2001 under the title: "General and Complete Disarmament: 
94 
International Arms Transfers".138 The group of experts included 18 individuals 
representing Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, 
Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Peru, Sri Lanka, UK, US, the USSR, Yugoslavia and 
Zimbabwe. Because there was not an appropriately qualified expert in Canada's 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade at the time, an NGO 
representative with respected expertise on small arms and light weapons, Ernie Regehr, 
then Director of Project Ploughshares, was appointed to represent Canada. Though he 
was accompanied to meetings by an official from the Permanent Mission in New York, 
Regehr is listed in the report as Canada's official representative and was duly instructed 
to participate actively in the negotiations, speaking freely. 
The Group of Experts negotiations did not proceed smoothly on all fronts and 
Regehr was in the position of maintaining Canada's pro-registry position without 
blocking consensus. Compelled to participate in the process, though not supportive of a 
compulsory registry system, the US and UK in particular supported a minimalist 
approach. However the aftermath of Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and indications that 
western states had initially supplied Iraq with the arms that enabled its actions, led to a 
broad call for stronger export control measures on conventional arms and greater 
transparency in transfers. A like-minded group including Brazil, Colombia, Zimbabwe 
and Canada emerged in the Group of Experts and considered the idea of preparing a 
minority report advocating a comprehensive and compulsory registry system, but 
eventually compromise was reached. The final result was a consensus report that was 
recommended to the UNGA (A/46/301) for the consideration of member states, calling 
for the creation of a voluntary reporting mechanism for both suppliers and recipients of 
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conventional arms, called a "universal and non-discriminatory arms transfer register 
under the auspices of the United Nations" (Para. 161.c).140 
Regehr's role as Canada's representative on the Group of Experts over four sets 
of international negotiations on the report that ultimately created the conventional arms 
registry demonstrates a very high level of government endorsement for an NGO 
representative. There was not, however, universal support for Regehr's participation 
among the Group: at one point in the negotiations the US queried whether the position of 
the Canadian representative was representative of Canadian policy.141 Regardless, Regehr 
had the full confidence of DFAIT and its senior management in his participation even in 
the difficult negotiations to reach the final compromise position.142 He attributed the 
support for his involvement in the Group of Experts to his professional reputation and 
working relationship with key officials in DFAIT at the time. Although he represented a 
small national NGO, without previous experience in such a multilateral process, Regehr 
was asked to represent Canada as a full-fledged member of the Group of Experts. It was 
only the direct support of the Canadian government, and confidence in Regehr's 
expertise, that allowed this. 
In order for individual non-governmental representatives to act in the capacity of 
an official delegation member, or country representative in the case of the Group of 
Experts, they require institutional support from the particular government, not affiliation 
with the UN or ECOSOC accreditation. In the cases of non-governmental representatives 
serving on official delegations, the individuals are accredited as representatives of the 
government for security clearance and participation in the official proceedings. As such, 
they do not face the limitations of other accredited NGOs and have full access to the UN 
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facilities and all proceedings. In the cases examined, only one individual represents an 
ECOSOC accredited NGO, namely VERTIC.143 Nor is involvement with the UN or 
proximity to its headquarters of particular importance in these cases. The institutions 
represented are for the most part based in locations outside of the UN centers with no 
regular representation or presence at the UN. For example, Bill Potter is based at the 
Monterrey Institute for International Affairs in northern California; Ernie Regehr is based 
in Waterloo, Ontario; and Gotz Neuneck and Una Becker work at the Peace Research 
Institute Frankfurt. And unlike the other project cases studied, none of the non-
governmental experts dedicate all of their time to the particular issue: several are 
professors or administrators, and most work on the full disarmament and security agenda. 
Unlike either the Landmine Monitor or RCW cases, where institutionalization 
with the UN is important for information gathering, political support and even funding, 
this is not the case with the individual experts. And as only a minority of individual 
experts required external funding for their participation on an official delegation, donor 
support is not a major concern.144 Rather, the cases include individuals with respected 
professional credentials, most of whom had previous connections with their government 
officials. Stein Villumstad was a member of a coalition of Norwegian NGOs and research 
institutions involved on the small arms issue and had cooperated with government before 
being invited to join his country's delegation to the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference. As 
a former diplomat and director of a research organization in Nairobi, Ochieng Adala was 
well known to the Kenyan government before being engaged in the meetings of the UN 
PoA. Bill Potter had worked with Kyrgyzstani diplomats earlier the 1990's through the 
Monterrey Institute, offering training in arms control issues, which led to his participation 
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as an advisor to that country. These professional connections are the means by which the 
individuals are 'institutionalized' with their governments and thus invited to participate 
as members of official delegations. However, over time this participation further 
strengthens that relationship. 
Building a Reputation 
The institutional support exhibited here depends on maintaining a reputation for 
quality work, but in some cases even this is not sufficient to maintain support from 
governments in particular. Dependence on states for political support or more importantly 
funds leaves a project susceptible to changes in the governing party, policy direction or 
program funding priorities. Landmine Monitor was established in cooperation with 
several key governments and has been able to retain its funding support for the 
maintenance of the monitoring effort over nine years; however, its editor Paul Harmon 
attests that this is a year to year challenge. Several key funders, including France and the 
UK, recently withdrew support for the project after several years of involvement because 
their funding priorities changed. Canada's Landmine Fund will run out of funding in 
2008, and with the recent corresponding change in government, Canada's place as the 
largest supporter of Landmine Monitor is likely to end.145 In the case of non-
governmental experts, government policy is an important determinant as to whether such 
experts are invited to participate on delegations. After contributing to five previous NPT 
delegations, in 2007 Ernie Regehr's name was not approved at the ministerial level for 
participation on Canada's PrepCom delegation. 
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Institutionalization as discussed in these cases stems from intentional effort on 
behalf of the NGOs, but that is not to say that it is unidirectional. The multilateral 
environment over the past decade has seen several initiatives to encourage greater 
interaction with NGOs and civil society more broadly. As was discussed previously, the 
human security debate was an important contributor to this climate of support for NGOs. 
Members of the Human Security Network including Austria, Canada, Ireland, Norway 
and Switzerland are important contributors to the Landmine Monitor (See Figure 7) and 
several of these states have invited NGO participation on official delegations. In the 
nuclear sector, states including Mexico, Brazil, Chile; South Africa, and 
Switzerland support NGO activities at NPT meetings, although none have yet had NGO 
representatives on their delegations.146 In the UN PoA process, sixteen developing states 
had an NGO representative on at least one delegation (See Appendix 5). 
The UN launched an initiative in the past decade to increase interaction with non-
state actors, including NGOs and other private entities. At the recommendation of 
ECOSOC (1996/297), the UNGA tasked the Secretary General with assessing 
arrangements for the interaction of NGOs in UN activities, outlined in his 1998 report.147 
Within the context of the UN reform effort, the Secretary General prepared a subsequent 
report "Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change" (A/57/387 
and Corr.l) that called for establishment of a Panel of Eminent Persons to make 
recommendations as to how the UN could enhance its cooperation with civil society. 
Endorsed by UNGA in December 2002 (A/57/300), the Panel was established in 2003 
and chaired by Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil. The 'Cardoso Report' that resulted 
from the Panel's consultations with representatives of civil society, "We the peoples: 
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civil society, the UN and global governance", contained 30 proposals to address civil 
society engagement in the UN.148 Unfortunately the mandate for the Cardoso Panel 
mixed constituencies, addressing both NGOs and other private sector partners under the 
mantel of 'civil society', with many proposals applied to NGOs, while making implicit 
reference to the business sector.149 In spite of the flaws with the Cardoso Panel's 
approach and its proposals, it recommended ways to 'enhance' civil society cooperation; 
highlighted the shortcomings of the existing procedures for UN-NGO engagement; and in 
the process, Panelists consulted with a wide range of NGOs. 
Institutional relationships are evident in each of the three cases examined however 
the focus of that integration is different. RCW is narrowly focused on the formal 
disarmament treaties and UN mechanisms therefore it is closely engaged with the Office 
of Disarmament Affairs. It makes use of formal avenues for NGO engagement in the UN 
system, including ECOSOC accreditation. Individual non-governmental experts are by 
definition reliant on the support of government officials to participate on official 
delegations, but have very little formal institutional dependence on the UN or donors. 
Personal contacts, fostered through professional qualifications and policy expertise, are 
imperative for developing the necessary relationships with officials. Because Landmine 
Monitor's needs are varied, its institutional connections are dispersed at the national and 
international level, across government institutions and UN agencies, and it uses a variety 
of means to build relationships. Landmine Monitor has a multi-dimensional approach, 
using informal and diplomatic exchanges with states party and interaction with 
specialized UN agencies for research, fundraising and political support. 
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This paper has explored the conditions that enable NGOs to build initiatives that 
perform functions on behalf of states and officials, demonstrating how these evolve to 
play important roles in the state-based system. In the three cases, NGOs made use of the 
opportunity to pursue an avenue of work, and the necessary tools to implement the 
project, but all show that institutional linkages are essential for the development and 
sustainability of the initiative. Relationships with external actors including donors, 
governments, and UN bureaucrats are important in acquiring financial resources, 
technical assistance and information, as well as political endorsement and support. 
Although the approach differs in each case, they all prioritize institutional relationships to 
sustain their activities. 
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Chapter 6 ~ Transparency, Professionalism and 
Legitimacy 
I began this paper with two questions: What conditions have enabled NGOs to 
engage directly in the state-centric system of the United Nations? And, specifically, why 
has the security and disarmament sector seen the proliferation of highly specialized 
NGOs and individuals providing essential services to states? Three very different cases 
provided the means by which to consider these questions. The Landmine Monitor project 
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines is the Mine Ban Treaty's de facto 
monitoring system. Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom, provides the only comprehensive, centralized and 
publicly accessible repository of disarmament related documentation. And individual 
non-governmental experts serve on official delegations to meetings of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and UN Programme of Action on 
small arms and light weapons as both advisors and liaisons with other NGOs. These cases 
provide insights about NGO engagement in the UN system, and the means by which they 
adapt to contribute as non-state actors. To conclude this paper, I will revisit some themes 
that emerged in the research, consider the limitations and outcomes of this NGO activity 
and propose areas for further study. 
I employed two theoretical approaches to consider the three initiatives. The first 
addresses the aspect of adaptation, or the conditions that have enabled the NGOs and 
individuals to develop these initiatives, with particular attention to the security and 
disarmament sector. My interpretation of Kerstin Martens' model, which was inspired by 
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the new-transnationalist approach to NGO engagement in multilateralism, provides a 
basic framework for this analysis. The model considers internal characteristics of the 
NGO and institutionalization of relations with the UN to examine change or adaptation. I 
added an initial element of opportunity, or the political circumstances that provided the 
opening for the project's creation. An examination of opportunity, the operational tools 
and structures of the initiatives, and their institutional relationships with the UN, 
governments and donors provides further clarity about how NGOs adapt to the state-
based security and disarmament sector. 
Evolution of the ICBL from a campaign focus to the Landmine Monitor's role in 
treaty monitoring required substantial political and institutional support, while the 
resources of the existing network facilitated field research. But the moral voice 
demonstrated during the campaign was retained in the accountability mission of 
Landmine Monitor. RCW was created by WILPF as a new and distinct project using 
electronic tools and professional tactics to provide tangible services to the disarmament 
community. Though a new project and style of work, RCW continues WILPFs leadership 
on the nuclear agenda. For individual experts, engagement on a government delegation 
typically represents a shift from academic or policy work to assume advisory 
responsibilities. This is only possible because of their individual qualifications and 
government support. 
The second theoretical approach provides a means to examine how non-state 
actors engage in the state-based multilateral world, impacting the political process and 
state decision-making. State-centric approaches to world politics are inadequate in their 
treatment of non-state actors, and yet it must be accepted that states are the primary unit 
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of analysis in the multilateral system. The question remains, then: how do NGOs engage 
in multilateral processes, particularly in the security and disarmament sector where rules 
of procedure are not accommodating to involvement by non-state actors? Through a 
constructivist lens, the social base of world politics clarifies the roles NGOs can play in a 
state-based system. Concepts of a moral 'third force', the norm promoter, and epistemic 
communities provide insight into how non-state actors can participate in the political 
process, in spite of limitations on their direct involvement. As norm promoters, RCW and 
Landmine Monitor work to institutionalize the landmine taboo and transparency norm 
respectively, acting as a third force in calling for accountability. Individual experts 
serving on official delegations contribute to the policy-making process as representatives 
of an epistemic community, influencing decision-making because of their expertise. More 
than fringe actors, these cases demonstrate how NGOs and non-governmental experts 
have adapted to provide services within the realm of state responsibility for the treaty or 
arrangement. 
Pursuing Transparency 
NGOs in the nuclear disarmament field in the late 1990's were frustrated by 
limitations on both their access to official proceedings and the documents distributed by 
states in those proceedings. The call for transparency among states in the arms control 
and disarmament process was echoed by the NGOs with regard to the multilateral process 
and RCW responded with its initiative to coordinate NGO participation and increase 
access to information in the primary disarmament bodies: the UNGA 1st Committee, CD 
and NPT. While transparency was a driving force in the RCW case, it is a theme 
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throughout the cases of NGO engagement in the multilateral process. In pursuit of 
transparency, the cases show efforts to increase the availability of information about 
Treaty compliance and implementation; promote NGO access to the multilateral system; 
and foster interaction between governments and NGOs. 
Increased information about state compliance - shown by Landmine Monitor, 
through the annual report, and RCW, with its disarmament library - is an immediate 
response to multilateral opacity. In both cases, the information gathered about Treaty 
implementation is disseminated in a free, publicly accessible format so as to make it as 
widely available as possible. But the cases demonstrate other steps to increase 
transparency at the multilateral level. As part of its program to coordinate the 
disarmament community, RCW has been a major advocate for increased NGO access to 
the NPT in particular. By maintaining a presence at all of the major disarmament bodies, 
RCW ensures some level of NGO engagement and has also worked for standard rules for 
NGO access in the NPT context. Non-governmental experts on official delegations are 
exposed to the political process in a direct way, participating in the development of 
positions, delegation discussions and closed negotiations. Through their liaison role, 
several of these experts report both to domestic NGOs and those present at the meeting, 
including when proceedings are in closed sessions. These individuals increase the flow of 
information about the official proceedings in this liaison role. In each of the cases, direct 
interaction with government officials facilitates the implementation of program 
objectives, but NGO-government interaction also fosters transparency. Through informal 
engagement with officials in the halls of the UN, sharing of draft Landmine Monitor 
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reports and direct partnership on official delegations, the work of governments in the 
various Treaty regimes is made more transparent to non-state actors. 
The link between transparency and compliance is an extension of the demand for 
accountability seen in both the RCW and Landmine Monitor cases. The Landmine 
Monitor project was designed as a civil society initiative to "hold governments 
accountable to the obligations they have taken with respect to antipersonnel mines"150 by 
monitoring compliance with Treaty obligations. For WILPF, restrictions on NGO access 
and limited availability of disarmament-related documentation fostered concerns about a 
lack of accountability to the various obligations of the disarmament treaty framework and 
provided a major impetus for the RCW project. Transparency, as a measure of 
accountability and thus compliance, is a recurrent theme in the three cases. In order to 
pursue transparency, however, the tactics used by the NGOs show another theme: that is 
'professionalization'. 
Professionalization in the NGO Sector 
The NGOs adopted a professional approach to their work, demonstrated in the use 
of skilled staff, specialized operational tools and targeted outreach strategies to 
implement the different activities. Landmine Monitor prioritizes ongoing researcher 
training and strengthening of its methodology to ensure consistent and high-quality 
research for its annual report. An international editorial board provides oversight and 
central editorial control is held by the lead agency. Although RCW operates on a much 
smaller scale, it retains a dedicated staff person in New York where informal interaction 
with governments and UN bureaucrats has been essential for document collection, and 
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capitalizes on its electronic resources to reach a wide audience. The individual experts all 
carry certain professional qualifications - as academics or practitioners - that led to their 
participation on the respective official delegations, as representatives of respected 
organizations. In the highly technical security and disarmament sector, 
professionalization, including specialized scientific and policy expertise, play an 
important role in establishing authority and credibility.151 
Employment of professional staff, tools and strategies in each of the three cases 
studied suggests an interest in establishing a reputation for quality and reliability. 
Reputation has an important role to play as the basis on which government, UN and 
donor support is built. The initiatives depended on the credentials of respected 
individuals and organizations to launch their initiatives. The success of the ICBL, 
WILPF's organizational legacy in the disarmament community, and the extensive 
resumes of the individual experts were important with regard to the initial opportunity. 
But over time the reputations of each initiative and individual continues to grow with 
demonstrated skill and professionalism. RCW has slowly built a reputation as its 
resources have expanded; today an official at the Office for Disarmament Affairs 
describes the RCW web resources 'indispensable' and called it 'astonishing' that this 
product has been developed on so few resources.152 Having served on an official 
delegation furthers an individual's reputation as an expert qualified to advise a 
government delegation. Bill Potter noted that through his long-term advisory role to the 
government of Kyrgyzstan on NPT delegations, he suspects he is "no longer seen 
primarily as an NGO rep by most of the other delegates".153 One researcher noted that 
unlike in the first years of the project, affiliation with Landmine Monitor literally opens 
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doors for field researchers today. Landmine Monitor has an unparalleled reputation 
among similar NGO projects and many initiatives have sought to emulate its approach. 
Landmine Monitor's professional monitoring approach has made it a model for 
NGOs in other arms control areas. The BioWeapons Prevention Project was founded in 
November 2002 by a network of NGOs with expertise in biotechnology following the 
failed negotiations over a protocol to strengthen the BTWC's weak compliance and 
verification scheme. The project seeks to "reduce the threat of bioweapons by monitoring 
and reporting throughout the world."154 Using a project design not unlike Landmine 
Monitor, the BWPP monitors relevant developments among governments and the private 
sector; reports on these through the BioWeapons Monitor, and networks global partners 
in the collection and analysis of data.155 The so called "Red Book" published by the 
Biting the Bullet initiative of International Alert, Saferworld and the University of 
Bradford together with IANSA tracks progress towards implementation of the UN PoA. 
The report was issued to coincide with biennial meetings of states on the PoA in 2003, 
2005 and the Review Conference in 2006. Like Landmine Monitor, the research was 
conducted by a network of researchers covering 180 countries.156 Professional and 
independent NGO treaty monitoring is now seen in several disarmament and security 
sectors, based on the success of Landmine Monitor. 
The concept of professionalism used here describes the means by which the three 
cases exhibit characteristics that emphasize quality and reliability in their work. Skill and 
expertise is highlighted with polished approaches and an image of professionalism. 
Fundamentally, a reputation for reliability and utility is required to ensure continued 
support from institutional actors, including both political and financial support.157 To 
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engage with UN staff and government officials - whether at major events or in capitals -
as an NGO representative, tactical decisions about approach, language and even dress 
code are made, as demonstrated throughout this research.15 Professional approaches and 
reliability over time support reputations that in turn, sustain the functional role of the 
initiative. But even while adopting professional approaches to pursue transparency and 
therefore accountability among states, there is an outstanding question about the very 
political legitimacy of NGOs as non-state actors in the multilateral political process. 
Legal and Political Legitimacy 
The dramatic growth in the number and level of participation of NGOs at the 
international level in the 1990's fed a dialogue about the UN's interaction with NGOs, 
the results of which were seen in the various reports of the Secretary General discussed 
previously. A parallel debate, however, questioned the legal status of NGOS and claims 
that they are 'representative'. Many of the same complaints leveled by NGOs at states 
about lack of transparency and accountability are echoed by critics of NGOs. It is not the 
purpose of this paper to address the full debate about NGO legitimacy, but in summary, it 
concerns both the legal standing and the political function of NGOs in the multilateral 
system. Legally speaking, the debate questions the involvement of NGOs in international 
politics given that they are not recognized as persons in international law, and thus have 
only limited rights of participation pursuant to Article 71 of the UN Charter and specific 
treaty instruments.159 The political debate rests on the claim that NGOs are undemocratic 
in that they do not represent the 'grassroots' as is widely assumed and that they often lack 
accountability to their own constituency, much less the general public.160 Concern about 
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the legitimacy of NGOs as actors in international politics must be considered in light of 
the highly integrated activities observed here. How is it that NGOs, as 'undemocratic' 
non-state actors and non-persons in international law, can play the central roles observed 
in the three case studies? 
The legitimacy question is primarily a result of the imbalance between the pace at 
which the role of NGOs has grown in comparison with the theoretical and legal 
framework. NGOs "continued to burrow into the nooks and crannies of world politics" 
(DeMars op cit) without a defined place such that it is now impossible to ignore their 
contributions. States contract NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid and implement 
development programs; fund NGO advocacy campaigns; and partner with them in public 
education and awareness-raising. And perhaps most relevant to the cases seen here, states 
rely on NGOs to provide services for them, including Treaty monitoring, documentation 
and expert advice. One argument for the legitimacy of NGOs is that they are implicitly 
acknowledged by states in policy and explicitly supported with resources. The body of 
international law also recognizes NGOs: UN resolutions and reports have addressed the 
UN-NGO relationship since the adoption of the Charter in 1945 and references to non-
governmental organizations appear in a range of treaty documents, including both the 
Mine Ban Treaty and UN PoA.161 The formal procedures codified for ECOSOC's 
relationship with NGOs, namely the provisions for accreditation, further legitimize NGOs 
in the UN context.162 
Critics expect of NGOs reflect the standards of legitimacy that are expected of 
states - adherence to democratic principles is equated with political legitimacy. The 
validity of this assumption is, however, contestable. Using Gordenker and Weiss' 
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definition of NGOs as "private citizens' organizations, separate from government but 
active on social issues, not profit making, and with transnational scope", the first 
parameter is that NGOs are private entities. It therefore stands to reason that they are not 
subject to the same expectations of a public institution, although they should be 
encouraged to maintain transparent and democratic governance with financial 
accountability. But such expectations should not exclude small organizations, with 
relevant interest or expertise on an issue but with simple governance structures or no 
significant constituency, from participating in the political process as private NGOs. 
Arguably in the security and disarmament sector this is even more relevant where 
technical expertise is valued and the constituency is largely western. NGOs have political 
motivations that subject them to criticism about accountability, but as is clear in the cases 
studied here, they are often service-providers, driven by principled positions and 
institutional survival. 
NGOs functioning in direct service of institutional and state objectives challenge 
the political legitimacy debate. The Ottawa Process that resulted in adoption of the Mine 
Ban Treaty was unique in that it involved NGOs, through the ICBL, as critical actors 
throughout the negotiations, an observer role that was ultimately codified in the meeting 
provisions of the Treaty in Article 11.4. As a continuation of the government-NGO 
partnership of the Ottawa Process, and with strong state support, Landmine Monitor 
shares this recognition as a legitimate actor in the Treaty context. By contrast, RCW is 
part of the wider community of disarmament NGOs that have struggled for increased 
access and participation in the nuclear sector. However, ECOSOC accreditation 
legitimizes its participation as an observer in standing bodies. Individual experts are 
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accredited members of an official delegation, with political legitimacy established 
through their affiliation with the representative government. The debate over the political 
legitimacy of NGOs will undoubtedly remain unresolved until such a time as the 
international system grapples with definitions and roles, however in the interim, NGOs 
will continue to find ways and means to participate in international politics in 
complementary ways. 
The Limitations of NGOs as Service Providers 
When the globalization debate was nearing its height at the end of the 1990's, 
Jessica Mathews' (1997: 50) made the triumphant claim that the "steady concentration of 
power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at 
least for a while" and that the authority of states was "dissolving", giving way to civil 
society and corporations. A decade later, a more restrained perspective accepts that there 
are limitations on NGO contributions to international politics. While I have demonstrated 
how NGOs can provide complementary, indeed necessary, services to states in the 
international system, it must be acknowledged that the state-dominated multilateral 
process itself is largely unchanged. In spite of the evidence that NGOs utilize multilateral 
mechanisms to engage with states at a high level in the provision of technical services, it 
is clear that they pose little challenge to state dominance in the official procedures of the 
UN's institutions and Treaties. The provisions of the Charter that established sovereign 
states as the members of the UN remain unchanged. Among the decisions for which 
states are responsible are those related to the accommodation of civil society participants 
in the rules of procedure for UN organs and treaties. NGOs continue to be subject to the 
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authority of states with regard to their involvement in the multilateral process and while 
they are now widely accepted as observers in official proceedings, there is little 
expectation that they will be endowed with enhanced participation rights. The limitations 
on NGO engagement in the multilateral system are therefore a notable constraint worth 
consideration. 
The primary enabler of NGO activity is financial: only with sufficient resources 
can NGOs sustain their operations and undertake highly professional activities. This 
requires that NGOs fundraise constantly and pursue new channels of funding as resources 
dry up. NGO initiatives are therefore limited by the reliability of financial support, and 
while the cases here have sustainable sources of funding, even these projects are 
continually adapted to match available resources. NGOs are often accused of chasing 
funding, or tailoring projects to the interests of donors, which is extremely difficult in the 
case of long-term projects. Because of funding challenges, they also regularly make-do 
with less than ideal resource levels, which has the affect of limiting activities. This was 
shown in the case studies where Landmine Monitor's network meetings have been 
curtailed by resource limitations and RCW has struggled to retain staff because of its 
modest compensation. The pressure to find financial support for their work makes NGO 
initiative inherently vulnerable. 
Government funding is often seen as more dependable, but it has its own 
limitations. As was discussed above, this funding is susceptible to changing government 
priorities with new policies and ruling parties. Reliance on government support - political 
and financial - can have negative implications for NGO independence, a threat to the 
project's neutrality, whether perceived or real. Landmine Monitor has struggled with this 
113 
throughout its existence because of its close partnership with the core group of state 
supporters. Its entire budget is currently funded by government donors, and while it has 
sought to widen this group, the majority includes like-minded supporters of the Ottawa 
process. Early in the project's existence, Trevor Findlay observed that Landmine 
Monitor's role "would be protected if funding.. .were derived from independent sources 
rather than, as at present, a select group of western states parties which, although strong 
supporters of the convention, may at some point not be in full compliance with the treaty 
themselves" (1999: 54). The legacy of its work has been to maintain objective and 
credible reporting in spite of the delicate relationship with its key funders and supporters. 
Credibility is a concern even when an NGO project is not predominantly funded 
by governments. Independent NGOs, driven by principled goals and policy objectives 
that are not necessarily consistent with government priorities, will always face 
ideological differences with states. Chayes and Handler Chayes (1995: 251) observe the 
challenges of NGOs assuming central roles in regime management: 
They define their own objectives, generate resources, and make commitments through their own 
internal processes. They have their own vision of compliance that may or may not coincide with 
that of the parties. They remain free to critique or attack the regime managers, national or 
international. It is therefore not surprising that they are not always appreciated by the states and 
international organizations that have official responsibility for managing the regime. 
RCW is part of a grassroots peace and women's organization determined to see the 
abolition of nuclear weapons and opposed to nuclear energy. Its work is used and 
appreciated by a cross-section of NGO, official and government users because of its 
practicality, but its policy positions are often contentious. Even among the NGO 
community, not all would agree with RCW's positions. Therefore, its credibility as a 
service to the community is in the value of the product to all actors, not necessarily the 
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political views of the organization. NGOs tread a careful line in seeking to balance 
credibility in the eyes of states with their principled positions. 
A final limitation of NGO initiatives is a practical one related to access: NGOs are 
very limited in their ability to access information. They must rely on open-source 
information and public sources to monitor compliance or provide analysis on a policy 
issue, as they are not privy to intelligence or classified information. Landmine Monitor's 
research is reliant entirely on open-source material, which could be seen as a limitation to 
its monitoring role. The access challenge also affects the ability of NGO representatives 
to attend meetings as closed sessions at multilateral will always prohibit external 
observers, regardless of the essential service an NGO might provide. This is further 
evidence to the unique position held by individual experts on official delegations, where 
they gain access to those closed meetings. 
The limitations NGOs face in the multilateral system are not insignificant, and in 
spite of these, they continue to find innovative ways to integrate their activities with 
official processes at a very high level. While this study is focused on the conditions that 
enable NGOs to engage in the state-based multilateral system, the obvious question is, 
'To what end?' Is Landmine Monitor encouraging state compliance with obligations 
under the Mine Ban Treaty? What is the impact of RCW's effort to document 
disarmament proceedings? How are individual experts affecting decision-making on 
government delegations? Though it is premature to suggest direct impacts of the case 
studies here on performance in the various treaty regimes, some observations can be 
made which suggest that NGO efforts are contributing to modest change in the security 
and disarmament sector. 
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A review of the Executive Summary of the 2007 Landmine Monitor Report 
provides some insight into the performance of the Mine Ban Treaty since the 
establishment of the NGO monitoring effort. Today 155 states are party to the Mine Ban 
Treaty, four of which acceded in 2007 (Montenegro, Indonesia, Kuwait and Iraq). 
Landmine Monitor has reported the continued decline in use of antipersonnel mines since 
the Treaty's entry into force, reporting that only two states (Myanmar and Russia - not a 
member state) laid new AP mines in 2007.164 It is estimated that states party have 
destroyed approximately 41.8 million AP mines since 1997; 80 states party have 
completed the destruction of their stockpiled landmines, and another sixty have declared 
that they never possessed AP mines.165 At publication in 2007, Landmine Monitor 
reported (Executive Summary, 2008: 15-16) ten states in the process of destroying 
stockpiled mines, although unfortunately it is anticipated that of these, Afghanistan, 
Belarus, and the Ukraine will not meet their deadlines for complete destruction. 
Performance on mine action is not as positive, with several badly affected states 
proceeding slowly on mine clearance and thus seeking extensions to the 10-year deadline 
for compliance with Article 5 obligations to destroy existing mines.166 Existing landmines 
continue to have their destructive effects: in 2006 there were a total of 5,751 documented 
casualties caused by mines and related items in 68 states.167 The performance of state 
party to the Mine Ban Treaty is encouraging on many fronts, although there are still 
serious concerns about non-states party that continue to produce, stockpile and use 
landmines. 
Another consideration with regard to impact of these NGO initiatives is the 
degree of transparency in the various bodies. At minimum, Landmine Monitor has played 
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an important role in sustaining attention on the continued landmine problem, highlighting 
successes and 'shaming' cases of non-compliance. Several examples cited previously 
demonstrate that states read and react to the annual report and these communications are 
posted on the Landmine Monitor website. States are required to submit annual reports 
under Article 7 and in 2007 there were mixed results on this transparency mechanism: 96 
percent of states required to do so submitted initial reports, however 70 states parties 
failed to submit their required annual update in 2006. Notably, Morocco, Poland and Sri 
Lanka submitted voluntary reports as non-states party (Executive Summary, 2008: 18-
18). In the nuclear context, the scope of RCW's reporting and documentation suggests a 
clear increase in access to information about the performance of states party since the 
2000 NPT RevCon. But since RCW began collecting documents on its website, the UN 
has also increased the accessibility of disarmament documentation, creating designated 
websites for the various NPT meetings and operating a live webcast during the 2005 
RevCon. 
Areas for Further Research 
A complete assessment of the impact of NGO action on state behaviour is a much 
larger study that carries with it great subjectivity and questions of causality. And yet, that 
research is necessary for a full picture of NGO participation in the multilateral system. 
While there are a wide range of studies exploring NGO activity in the environmental, 
human rights and development sector, the security and disarmament sector has received 
comparatively less attention.168 A decade of NGO monitoring through the Landmine 
Monitor and comparative cases in the small arms and light weapons and biological 
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weapons contexts could enable a more thorough analysis of the impact of NGO 
monitoring on state compliance. Similarly, the range of cases of individual experts sitting 
on government delegations across the disarmament and security sector warrants attention. 
The cases examined here are service-based: the NGOs provide their monitoring 
and documentary services or personal expertise to UN member states and the broader 
public. Other cases exist where NGOs are virtually seizing the reigns from government to 
negotiate Treaties, acting as norm entrepreneurs. This was seen during the Ottawa 
Process, as well as the Kimberley Certification Process for Rough Diamonds and to some 
degree the Arms Trade Treaty process that is in its infancy. How do these activities differ 
from the service-oriented functions? What conditions are in place and how do they differ 
from those seen in this study? It would also be interesting to examine other sectors to 
compare how NGOs approach multilateral cooperation differently in other fora. Is the 
security and disarmament context, and its history as the center of 'high polities', unique 
in fostering this level of NGO engagement? 
By their sheer numbers, NGOs challenge the logistical and procedural operations 
of the UN system - accreditation procedures, security measures, and meeting room 
accommodations are all strained by large groups of NGO observers in attendance at UN 
meetings. Rules of procedure and official protocols are unlikely to change significantly to 
change the status of non-state actors in the UN system, yet there are measures that could 
be taken to maximize the benefits of NGO contributions to the process and minimize the 
limitations. The existence, and predicted growth, of NGOs in the multilateral operations 
of the security and disarmament sector points to areas where further research is required 
to guide the development of mechanisms for UN-NGO cooperation. 
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Conclusion 
Landmine Monitor, Reaching Critical Will, and the examples of non-
governmental experts participating on official delegations demonstrate the degree to 
which NGOs are integrating their activities into the state-centric UN system. When the 
political opportunity was present, the NGOs had the appropriate human, technical and 
financial resources, and institutional relationships were fostered to ensure the necessary 
external support, the initiatives grew to play important roles in the respective regimes. By 
these means, the NGOs engage directly with states in the provision of essential services, 
while retaining their identity as independent non-governmental organizations. Although 
the theoretical and legal foundations regarding the position of NGOs in the multilateral 
system are not fully developed, they continue to find new and innovative ways to 
participate in the political process without the rights of states. Motivated by the pursuit of 
transparency and state accountability, NGOs are demonstrating increasingly professional 
and strategic tactics to implement their activities with novel use of electronic tools, 
international networks, and personal expertise. NGOs are establishing that they are 
legitimate political actors through the services they provide, in spite of the ambiguity that 
remains about their definition. 
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delegations. 
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 Email interview with Bev Delong, 21 February 2008. 
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 Interview with Ernie Regehr, 20 February 2008. 
81
 This argument does not seek to assess whether the role of NGOs in international development has been 
successful or not. Certainly there are many who would argue it has not been, see 
82
 The norm is not universally accepted and a number of countries have never engaged NGO experts on 
official delegations. The US has had limited NGO cooperation, and there are very few examples from 
Middle-Eastern, Eastern European, or Asian countries, namely China which has expressed reservation 
toward NGO participation in security fora in the past. 
83
 Jody Williams and Steve Goose noted: "A major strength of the ICBL was its ability to cut across 
disciplines to bring together a diverse array of NGOs to work towards a single goal." See "The 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines" in Cameron et al, op. cit.., 22. 
84
 The Kenya Coalition Against Landmines was an original member of the Core Group, which in 2005 was 
renamed an Editorial Board when Mines Action Canada assumed the role of lead agency, which Human 
Rights Watch had held since 1999. Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Toward a Mine-Free World, Executive 
Summary, 2. 
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 Maintenance of the online database has subsequently stopped. Steve Goose and Mary Wareham of 
Human Rights Watch (then publisher of the Landmine Monitor) provided an overview of the 1999 report, 
125 
Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World, based on its Executive Summary, in 
"Landmine Monitor: Citizens Verification in Action" in Disarmament Forum 4 (1999) 33-43. 
86
 "Landmine Monitor Researcher" job posting from www;ieljefwekinj Reference Code RW6HKL57-19 
closed as of 14 November 2005. 
87
 Initially, Landmine Monitor relied almost exclusively on researchers from within the ICBL network, but 
it was not always true that a good campaigner made a good researcher. In order to ensure consistent and 
high-caliber research, professional researchers were engaged to work on the annual report where necessary. 
The network now consists of both professional researchers, and network representatives. 
88
 Data from "About Landmine Monitor" and "Acknowledgements" sections of successive issues of the 
Landmine Monitor Report Executive Summary (1999-2007). Online: www.icbl.org/lm. 2008 figures with 
the list of current researchers online: http://www.icbl.org/lm/contacts/research network 
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 Each issue of the report, in the "About Landmine Monitor" section of the front matter, includes some 
version of the following caveat: "Landmine Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report has its 
shortcomings. It is to be viewed as a work in progress, a system that will be continuously updated, 
corrected and improved. We welcome comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and 
others, in the spirit of dialogue and in the search for accurate and reliable information on a difficult 
subject." 
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 The exact timeline has varied slightly over the years, depending whether the Meeting of States Parties 
was held in September or November. The first report was produced on a very compressed schedule in order 
to meet the deadline of the First Meeting of States Parties, held in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. The 
editors acknowledged that strict time constraints "did not allow for full synthesis and analysis of the wealth 
of information gathered." In "About Landmine Monitor", Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-
Free World, 2. 
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 Burma is, for example, a country for which a particular research methodology has been developed to 
overcome the limitations on information access the result from a secretive military regime and general 
incapacity in the country's institutions. Absolute measures are therefore impossible, but indicators have 
been developed based on interviews with humanitarian aid staff and landmine victims at the border refugee 
camps to approximate landmine-affected regions and their markings, and to track incidents. Telephone 
interview with Yeshua Mosher-Puangsuwan, Burma country researcher, 21 March 2008. 
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 The About Landmine Monitor section of every report reiterates this pledge stating: "Landmine Monitor 
is not designed to send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting." 
Landmine Monitor Report 2007': Toward a Mine-Free World, Executive Summary, V. 
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 The UN Mine Action Centre provides its mine action resources (a database, links, and newsletter) online: 
http://www.mineaction.org/'. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, a Swiss-
government funded NGO, maintains its website onlinet: http://www.gichd.org/ Research resources include 
a major database of mine-related evaluations organized by country, subject, commissioning organization, 
evaluated organization and date. 
94
 Each of the four editorial board member organizations appoints one of the Thematic Research 
Coordinators and pays their salary. 
95
 Different formations of the consultation process have been used in the past, including two full network 
meetings, a series of regional meetings and a full network meeting, and more recently a focused 
preliminary consultation with the Thematic Research Coordinators with a full network meeting near the 
end of the process. Unfortunately, the costs of holding the international meeting are prohibitive and in 
2008, no full network meeting will be held. 
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 The Landmine Monitor 2008 Research Orientation Guide, a 48 page document for the use of all 
researchers, is on the ICBL website at: 
http://www.icbl.org/lm/content/download/29671/474135/file/LM08_Research_Orientation_Guide.pdf 
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 "Ban Policy Guidelines" for Landmine Monitor Report 2008, 3. Online: 
http://www.icbl.org/lm/content/download/28843/468697/file/2008JJan_Guide.pdf 
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 See Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines", 
International Organization 52:3, 1998: 613-644. 
99
 Emily Schroeder, Rhianna Tyson and Ray Acheson were all WILPF interns before being hired as 
Program Associate. Edith Ballantyne has been engaged on disarmament themes for some 40 years and is 
still active as an advisor. Suzi Snyder, current Secretary General, has worked with WILPF for five years, 
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 Rhianna Tyson noted that improvements in scanning technology, and the availability of a portable 
scanner and laptop, have enabled RCW to make documents available almost immediately after the staff 
acquire a hard copy. 
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simple format and orderliness of the first design. 
103
 Warkentin is interested in the role the internet plays in enabling NGOs to contribute to international 
politics as part of 'global civil society'. His analysis explores dynamism, exhibited by flexibility and 
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informed activism in eight case studies from the environmental and development sectors, and several online 
resource networks. Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet and Global Civil Society (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
104
 Although transparency is frequently referenced in the multi-lateral context it remains ill-defined and 
there is no agreed way of measuring transparency. Ann Florini examines these challenges in her article, 
"Does the Invisible Hand Need a Transparent Glove? The Politics of Transparency" Paper prepared for the 
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 28-30, 1999. 
Online: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWB.IGOVANTCQR/Resource-s/florini.pdf 
105
 Dr. Potter's support for the Kyrgyz delegation extends from his involvement in a Monterrey Institute for 
International Studies program in the early 1990's to train young diplomats from the NIS on non-
proliferation and related themes and his personal connections with a former Soviet diplomat who was in 
residence at MIIS during that time. Email interview with Dr. Potter, 22 February 2008. 
I know of no cases where individuals from particularly activist organizations have served as official 
delegation members. Some organizations, Amnesty International for example, have policies against 
aligning too closely with governments for risk of appearing compromised and would therefore likely refuse 
an invitation to join a government delegation. Invited to join the New Zealand delegation to the 2000 NPT 
RevCon, Alyn Ware of International Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms refused the opportunity in order to 
maintain his independence as an NGO activist. 
107
 Haas does not limit this to scientific communities, but rather states: "what bonds members of an 
epistemic community is their shared belief or faith in the verity and the applicability of particular forms of 
knowledge or specific truths." "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy 
coordination", International Organization 42:1 (1992) 3, note 4. 
108
 Though much more technical in nature, the provisional secretariat for the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and its International Monitoring Network for example, operates on an annual budget split between 
$56.58 million US plus 43.57 million Euro for 2008. "The United States pays US $23.8 million to the 
CTBTO" (Vienna, CTBTO Press Release: 26 February 2008). Online: 
http://www.ctbto.org/press centre/press release.dhtml?item=313 
109
 In the early years of RCW there were in fact complaints from other NGOs that felt RCW was 
undervaluing its work and therefore making it hard for other NGOs to justify their project budgets. 
However, the nature and focus of its work has never made RCW a particularly 'fundable' project and its 
budget remains very constrained. 
110
 It was observed by at least one NGO representative that bearing the upfront costs of attending a multi-
week meeting in New York or Geneva is prohibitive and therefore could limit the pool of potential 
participants. The same individual is an unpaid NGO worker, but whose travel expenses were paid for by the 
government she represented. 
111
 For example, Gotz Neuneck funded his own participation on the 2005 German NPT delegation; Angela 
Woodward received support from the New Zealand Peace and Disarmament Education Trust for 
participation in the BWC delegation; and IANSA assisted Florella Hazeley in her attendance to the UN 
PoA RevCon on the delegation of Sierra Leone. 
112
 This observation is based on personal experience in seeking funding for a space security monitoring 
project that was initiated, and funded, by the Canadian government. The government funder planned to 
decrease its funding for the project after the second year while other private foundations encouraged the 
project manager to pursue 'sustainable' government funding. 
113
 Paul Hannon described his experience in fundraising and the perpetual struggle to ensure funds for the 
Landmine Monitor from year to year. 
114
 In 2008 no international Landmine Monitor conference will be held because of insufficient funding. 
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115
 Rhianna Tyson, RCW Project Manager from 2003 to 2005, observed that the events of 9/11 instigated a 
shift in the funding priorities of US foundations, the dominant source of RCW project funding. Even 
among more sympathetic funders, interest shifted to domestic issues away from the multilateral sector, and 
to the terrorism agenda away from traditional disarmament themes, affecting RCW's ability to finance its 
budget. 
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 Data from "Acknowledgements" sections of respective issues of the Landmine Monitor Report, 
Executive Summary (1999-2007) Online: www.icbl.org/lm. 
117
 Theoretically, a single incident of quasi-state activity might be possible, however, the cases demonstrate 
that political openness, programmatic tools including financial resources, and institutional support over the 
long-term enable this level of engagement with states in the multilateral context. 
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 As mentioned above, several countries including Burma, the DPRK and Iran, refuse to cooperate with 
Landmine Monitor however the vast majority do. 
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 A database of all government correspondence is included on the Landmine Monitor website, and can be 
sorted by country or date. Online: http://www.icbl.org/lm/comments/ 
120
 It must be acknowledged that civil society has long played an active role in monitoring human rights 
around the world under the leadership of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch among others. 
121
 Paul Hannon noted that each of the core group of states that drove the Ottawa Process and funded the 
Monitor were unhappy with how they were reflected in the first issue of the report. Mary Wareham cites 
Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy's displeasure with the following reference from the 
1999 Annual Report: 
"Canada appended the following "understanding" to its ratification instrument: 
'It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in the context of operations, exercises or other 
military activity sanctioned by the United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance with the 
international law, the mere participation by the Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations, 
exercises or other military activity conducted in combination with the armed forces of States not party to 
the Convention which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be 
considered to be assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the meaning of those terms 
in Article 1, paragraph 1(c). '1[2] 
This understanding seems clearly aimed at permitting Canadian forces to fight side-by-side with the United 
States in a war in which U.S. forces use antipersonnel mines. " 
"Canada Country Report" Landmine Monitor 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World. Online: 
http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/canada.html 
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 Paul Hannon of Mines Action Canada, the current editorial lead agency, noted that the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, Burma (Myanmar), and increasingly Iran are not cooperative with researchers 
while Russia and China have never been forthcoming with information. Interview, 1 April 2008. 
123
 In 2002, the US discontinued its own semi-annual report on landmine production, stockpiles and use 
because the Landmine Monitor was doing the same work better and at a lower cost. 
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 Letter from Richard Maude, Assistant Secretary, Arms Control and Disarmament Branch, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor, 7 September 2000. Online: 
http://www.icbl.org/lrn/cornments/(,sortVcountry 
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 Meetings of States Parties have been held in Maputo, Mozambique (1999) Managua, Nicaragua (2001) 
Bangkok, Thailand (2003) Nairobi, Kenya (RevCon - 2004), Zagreb, Croatia (2005) and The Dead Sea, 
Jordan (2007) and in Geneva during alternating years. Four Intersessional Standing Committees meet 
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Service (DPKO) is published annually. Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2007, tenth edition by Mine 
Action Service (DPKO), UNDP, UNICEF (New York 2007: UN) 
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 United Nations Inter-Agency Mine-Action Strategy: 2006-2011. Online: 
httElZ/wwvymdjxorg^ 
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 April 4, 2008 Message from the UN Secretary General on the International Day for Mine Awareness 
and Assistance in Mine Action online: http://www.mineaction.org/overview.asp?o=2166& 
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 Some in the wider NGO community are concerned about possible compromise when an initiative is so 
closely connected with states. 
130
 Of course this access must conform to the rules of procedure for the respective bodies, dependent on 
whether a session is open or closed, or other restrictions of the chairperson. 
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131
 For major conferences such as meetings of the NPT Review Cycle, all NGOs are required to be 
accredited specifically for that event, so the grounds pass is less important. 
Stephanie Fraser was tasked with developing the first RCW website and collected key NPT documents 
including treaty texts, agenda, and official conference documents from the UN library, copied them to disk, 
and posted them online for NGOs to use in preparation for the RevCon. She noted that the US State 
Department linked its website to the RCW site for access to the documents for the 2000 RevCon. During 
the conference, the British American Security and Information Council (BASIC) scanned and posted key 
conference statements and interventions, which RCW linked to. After 2000, RCW took on this role 
entirely. 
133
 One former staff person (2003-4) recalled occasional difficulty in tracking down documents from then-
DDA, but overall the relationship was described as productive and reciprocal. 
134
 There is of course regularly opposition to the more contentious content of the newletter. Some 
diplomats, however, have told RCW staff that they use the newsletter to report back to their capital during a 
busy conference and others from smaller delegations rely on the newsletter to follow the proceedings when 
they cannot attend all meetings. 
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 For example, the 2008 Norwegian statement on Negative Security Assurances was shared with RCW 
and is posted online, but it was not disseminated in the meeting hall. Online: 
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements/May02Norway ND&NSA.pdf 
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 UN security badges are colour-coded depending on the kind of accreditation the individual carries. NGO 
badges are generally brown, while government badges are red, and the heads of delegations wear a yellow 
badge. 
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139
 Describing his instructions from DFAIT, Regehr noted he was told to push as far as possible for a strong 
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 See the Conventional Arms Register online: http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html 
141
 Regehr recounted that on one occasion in the negotiations a US delegate questioned whether a comment 
he made "was the position of the Canadian government". Interview 20 February 2008. 
142
 There was reportedly some apprehension to Regehr's participation among the officials in International 
Trade who implement export control policy, although Foreign Affairs had the lead on the portfolio and 
were responsible for appointing the representative. 
143
 The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) is accredited with ECOSOC as a 
member of the Roster pursuant to Council Resolution 1996/302. E/2007/INF/4"List of non-governmental 
organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council as of October 17, 2007". Online: 
http://esa.iin.org/coordiiiation/iigo/new/INF2007.pdf 
144
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representatives have programmatic funding needs unrelated to participation on delegations and most of the 
academics are also engaged in seeking funds for research. Those that did require funds to participate in the 
delegation made use of existing academic and foundation contacts. For example, Angela Woodward's 
travel was funded by a scholarship program for peace and disarmament research and IANSA supported 
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countries totaling $172 million however the funding runs out in 2008. Online: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/mines/iv/menu-en.asp 
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states parties. Further, Ambassadors from several of these have been interviewed for the News in Review, 
and Mexico has repeatedly welcomed NGO involvement in the NPT in its official statements. Notably, at 
the 2007 PrepCom, Costa Rica submitted a working paper on a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, based 
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http://www.reachingcriticalwill.Org/legal/ii:pt/prepcom07/workingpapers/17.pdf 
147
 UN A/53/150 - "Arrangements and practices for the interaction of non-governmental organizations in 
all activities of the United Nations system", Report of the Secretary-General. 10 July 1998. Online: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/53/plenary/a53-170.htm 
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 Online: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/376/41/PDF/N0437641.pdf7OpenElement 
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149
 Peter Willetts gave a scathing review of the Cardoso Report, criticizing the unqualified panel 
membership; incoherent theoretical assumptions; and impractical recommendations. He observed that "The 
Cardoso Report was poorly received by all significant political actors: by governments from both the North 
and the South, by most NGOs, and by the UN Secretary-General." "The Cardoso Report on the UN and 
Civl Society: Functionalism, Global Corporatism, or Global Democracy?", Global Governance 12:3 (2006) 
308. Among the NGO community, the Global Policy Forum - a New York-based NGO with expertise in 
UN-NGO relations - responded to the report with criticism of the 'multistakeholder approach', which it 
views as a sub-text for increasing business partnerships. Among its greatest criticisms was the proposal to 
merge the NGO Liaison Service with several other bodies serving non-state constituencies. Jens Martens 
and James Paul, "Comments on the Report of the Cardoso Panel (New York: Global Policy Forum) August 
2004. Online: http://wwvv.globalpolicv.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/08gpf.pdf. The Secretary 
General responded to the report in: UN A/59/354 - Report of the Secretary-General in response to the 
report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations. 13 September 2004. 
Online: http://www.un-iigls.org/edited%20advance%20report0/o20of)/o20SG%20on%20Cardoso.pdf 
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 This statement is repeated annually in the "About Landmine Monitor" section of Toward a Mine-Free 
World. 
151
 While professionalism may be perceived as an attribute when it increases effectiveness, the disarmament 
community has experienced division between organizations perceived to be professional and others with a 
grassroots base. In other sectors, including human rights and development, professionalism is equated with 
elitism, particularly in the developing world. See Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, "NGO Legitimacy: Reassessing 
Democracy, Accountability and Transparency", Cornell Law School LL.M. Papers Series 6 (2005) 22. 
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 Quoted form email correspondence with Randy Rydell, Senior Political Advisor, Office of Disarmament 
Affairs, 18 March 2008. 
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 Quoted from email correspondence with Dr. Bill Potter, 22 February 2008. 
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 See "About the Bio Weapons Prevention Project" online: http://wwvv.bwpp.org/about.html 
155
 While BWPP planned to publish an annual analysis of developments with regard to the BTWC, it only 
published one copy of the BioWeapons Report, in 2004, online: 
http://www.bwpp.org/documents/2004BWRFinal 000.pdf 
156
 The Bite the Bullet project maintained final editorial responsibility for the content of the report and 
acknowledges limitations because of lack of transparency in some countries, the wide scope of the PoA and 
the gap between publication (May 2006) and the July 2006 Review Conference. See, Mike Bourne et al, 
Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006: Assessing the First Five Years of the UN Programme of Action. 
Arms (Biting the Bullet, 2006). Online: http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/red_book_2006.pdf 
1571 have, however, stated above that this support is never guaranteed, as policy developments and new 
government priorities will always affect the ability to raise funds in particular. 
158
 The unwritten diplomatic dress code calls for business attire at all official meetings. NGOs attending 
multilateral meetings regularly adapt their dress accordingly, which is essentially a requirement for non-
governmental experts. 
159
 Bosire Maragia states: "NGOs are not international legal persons, and by extrapolation, are not therefore 
subjects of international law with rights and duties thereunder. Adhering to the letter of the law, NGOs do 
not generally have official rights of participation save those narrowly defined under specific international 
instruments such as Article 71 of the United Nations." "Almost there: Another way of conceptualizing and 
explaining NGOs quest for legitimacy in global politics", Non-State Actors and International Law 2 (2002) 
304. 
160 There is a large body of literature, particularly in the development sector, that expands upon these 
arguments. See Claire Mercer, op. cit., for a review of the literature. 
161
 The Mine Ban Treaty has provisions for NGO observers at meetings of State Party, identified in Article 
11.4. The UN PoA references civil society contributions to the small arms issue in Preambular Paragraph 
16 and in Section IV, Paragraph 2 (c). Maragia notes that NGOs are given prominent place in the UN 
human rights framework and environmental law, including the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, and the Convention on the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage. Maragia, Op. cit., 329-330. 
162
 Rana Lehr-Lehnardt notes that ECOSOC encourages accountability and democratic process in the NGO 
statute, with international NGOs only considered for accreditation if they are "of a representative character 
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and of recognized international standing". "NGO Legitimacy: Reassessing Democracy, Accountability and 
Transparency", Cornell Law School LL.MPapers Series 6 (2005) 36. 
163
 For various reasons, including compliance with charitable laws or the ECOSOC statute, many NGOs are 
required to maintain such standards. 
164
 Use by non-state armed groups was reported in at least eight states in 2007. See Landmine Monitor 
Report 2007: Toward a Mine-Free World, Executive Summary, 11. 
165
 A further five states parties have not formally declared whether or not they have AP mines but are not 
believed to. Executive Summary, 15. 
166
 Among those unlikely to meet the deadline are Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Mozambique, Niger, Peru, 
Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe and Falkland Islands, for which Argentina 
and the UK are responsible for mine clearance. Executive Summary, 25-6. 
167
 This total includes victims - death and injury - of mines, explosive remnants of war and victim-
activated improvised explosive devices. The actual total of mine casualties is likely much higher due to the 
inadequacy of casualty reporting in many affected countries: the report notes that "data collection is 
inadequate or non-existent in 64 of 68 countries with recorded casualties." Executive Summary, 39. 
168
 The UN Institute for Disarmament Research did some useful work on NGO engagement in the security 
and disarmament section, but there is room to build on this. See "NGOs as Partners: Assessing the Impact, 
Recognizing the Potential" Issue, Disarmament Forum 1 (2002). The Verification Research, Training and 
Information Centre (VERTIC) focused particularly on NGO monitoring. Online: 
http://www.vertic.org/publications.asp 
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Robin Collins, Board Member, Mines Action Canada 
Paul Harmon, Executive Director, Mines Action Canada 
Jacqueline Hansen, Managing Editor, Landmine Monitor 
Robert (Bob) Lawson, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada) 
Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Mine Ban Policy Research Coordinator, Landmine Monitor 
Reaching Critical Will 
Ray Acheson, Project Associate 
Stephanie Fraser, Contractor, 1999-2000 
Dimity Hawkins, Contractor, 2000-2001 
Felicity Hill, Project Founder, former Manager, WILPF UN Office 
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate 2005-2007 
Randy Rydell, Senior Political Affairs Office, Office of the High Representative, UN 
Office for Disarmament Affairs 
Emily Schroeder, Project Associate 2002-3 
Susi Snyder, Secretary General, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 
former Manager, WILPF UN Office 
Rhianna Tyson, Project Associate 2003-5 
Non-Governmental Experts 
Ochieng Adala, Africa Peace Forum 
Una Becker, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 
Bev Delong, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
Florella Hazeley, Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms 
Gotz Neuneck, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 
William Potter, Monterrey Institute for International Affairs 
Ernie Regehr, Senior Advisor, Project Ploughshares 
John Simpson, University of Southampton 
Stein Villumstad, World Conference on Religions for Peace (formerly with Norwegian 
Church Aid) 
Angela Woodward, VERTIC 
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Appendix 2 - Article 7 of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction 
Article 7 
Transparency Measures 
1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as 
soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of 
this Convention for that State Party on: 
a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9; 
b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under 
its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if 
possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled; 
c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are 
suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to 
include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of 
anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced; 
d) The types, quantities, and if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines 
retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, 
mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of 
destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or 
transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3; 
e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel 
mines production facilities; 
f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance 
with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in 
destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and 
environmental standards to be observed; 
g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the 
quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with 
Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type 
of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4; 
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h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the 
extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, 
where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate 
identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this 
information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic 
content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine 
clearance; and 
i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the 
population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5. 
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the 
States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports 
received to the States Parties. 
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Appendix 3 - New Zealand Policy on NGO Experts 
CABINET OFFICE CO (00) 14 
CIRCULAR 12 December 2000 
Officers for Enquiries: 
Director, UN and Commonwealth 
Division, 
All Ministers 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
All Chief Executives 
All Senior Private Secretaries 
Procedures for Including Non-Official Representatives On Official 
Delegations to International Meetings 
Key Points 
• Cabinet has agreed to standardise procedures for including non-official representatives on 
official New Zealand delegations to international meetings. 
• Decisions about including non-official representatives in official delegations should be 
made in accordance with the guidelines attached to this circular and must be cleared in 
writing with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
• Ministers should seek approval from Cabinet to include Members of Parliament in official 
delegations and should advise Cabinet about the inclusion of any non-official representatives 
in official delegations at the same time as recommendations on Ministerial and official 
participation are put to Cabinet. 
Introduction 
1 From time to time the government receives requests to include non-official 
representatives in official New Zealand delegations to international meetings, or invites 
non-official representatives (e.g. scientific or business experts) to join delegations 
because of the special expertise they can offer. Among non-official representatives who 
have joined New Zealand delegations in the past have been Members of Parliament, 
members of Crown entities and state-owned enterprises, representatives of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), industry groups, and representatives of Maori 
interests. 
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2 The inclusion of non-official representatives in official delegations contributes breadth 
and specialist knowledge to the delegation, and can generate a better understanding of the 
government's objectives in the parent organisations of non-official representatives. 
Departments should consider the value that can be added to a New Zealand delegation by 
the inclusion of appropriate non-official representatives. 
3 Cabinet has agreed to a standard set of guidelines and procedures for including non-
official representatives in official New Zealand delegations to international meetings. 
This circular sets out those guidelines and outlines how departments should implement 
them. 
Guidelines Governing Inclusion of Non-Official Representatives in Official 
Delegations 
4 The guidelines have been developed from existing practice and guidelines in relation to 
the inclusion of NGO officials in official delegations. Cabinet has amended these 
guidelines and agreed to extend them to all non-official representatives being considered 
for inclusion in official delegations. A copy of the guidelines is attached as Annex I. 
5 A key to ensuring the effective operation of official delegations is to examine the balance 
of the delegation in determining whether, or what proportion of, non-official 
representatives should be included. To avoid claims of official bias when there are 
competing requests for representation from similar NGOs, and where the size of the 
delegation is limited, the bodies may be asked to agree on one or more representative 
acceptable to them all. 
6 It is generally expected that travel and accommodation costs of non-official members of 
official delegations will be met by the members or their sponsoring organisations. Where 
their inclusion is at the request of the government because of the special expertise they 
may bring to the delegation, however, the government may consider meeting costs 
officially. 
7 Non-official representatives included in official New Zealand delegations to international 
meetings must be either New Zealand permanent residents or New Zealand citizens. 
Conditions Applying to Participation 
8 For non-official representatives to be effective, it is desirable that they be able to 
participate fully in the delegation's activities and be treated as full members of the team. 
All members of official delegations are bound by conditions of confidentiality and take 
their instructions from the head of the delegation, and these conditions must apply 
equally to non-official representatives. 
9 Representatives of NGOs, other non-official bodies, and civil society groups are required 
to sign a standard undertaking governing members of official delegations. A copy of the 
undertaking is attached as Annex II. A different procedure applies to Members of 
Parliament (see paragraphs 15-16 below). 
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Procedures 
10 Proposals to include non-official representatives in official delegations to international 
meetings must be cleared in advance in writing by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade. 
11 The lead agency managing New Zealand's participation in an international meeting 
should seek approval for the inclusion of non-official representatives under the terms of 
the agreed guidelines. The lead agency is also responsible for ensuring that non-official 
representatives sign the required undertaking in respect of conditions for participation in 
official delegations. 
12 Where an agency other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has the lead, that 
approval should be sought in a submission to the Minister concerned, which should be 
referred to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade for agreement. 
13 In cases where there is a well established and agreed practice of including non-official 
representatives in delegations to regular meetings, such as for example the annual ILO 
Conference, it is not necessary to seek approval on every occasion. 
14 Cabinet should be advised of any non-official representatives in official delegations at the 
same time as recommendations are made to Cabinet on Ministerial and official 
participation. 
Participation by Members of Parliament 
15 The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade will generally formalise the inclusion of any 
Members of Parliament joining official delegations through the signature of a credentials 
document. It is not appropriate to request Members of Parliament to sign the same 
undertaking as other non-official representatives. Instead the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade or, where appropriate, the Minister leading the delegation, will write to 
Members of Parliament prior to the meeting drawing their attention to the conditions 
governing members of official delegations. 
16 The Minister leading the delegation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 
consultation with the Prime Minister and other interested Ministers, should seek approval 
from Cabinet to include Members of Parliament in official delegations. This should, if 
appropriate, occur at the same time as recommendations are made to Cabinet on 
Ministerial and official participation. 
Further Information 
17 Further information is available from the United Nations and Commonwealth Division of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, telephone 494 8324. 
Marie Shroff 
Secretary of the Cabinet 
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Annex I 
Guidelines Governing Inclusion Of Non-Official Representatives 
On Official Delegations 
Decisions about the inclusion of non-official representatives on official delegations should be 
taken by the Ministers concerned, who should be provided, where possible, with information 
on the following points: 
• Whether the representative can obtain observer status at the conference in his or her own 
right, through their parent body or through an NGO association. If this is possible, that 
should be the preferred option. 
• The general objectives of the representative and their sponsoring organisation and their 
particular objectives for the conference under consideration. 
• Points of similarity and difference between the government's policy and objectives and 
those of the representative and their sponsoring organisation. 
• Advantages to the government in including the representative on the delegation, for 
example because of specialised knowledge and expertise. 
• The general balance of the delegation, taking into account its overall size. The smaller the 
delegation, the less appropriate it is to include non-official representation. 
• Whether the meeting is one where non-official representatives are perceived as 
acceptable to other governments, especially the host government. 
• Assurance that the particular person nominated has the support of the sponsoring 
organisation in question, is a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident and - on the 
basis of known information - is a person acceptable to the government. 
Should a selection have to be made amongst more than one qualified non-official 
representative, the organisations concerned should reach agreement on one nomination for 
the government to consider. 
Participation by non-official representatives will be subject to acceptance in writing by the 
person nominated of the conditions as set out in Annex II. 
In principle, non-official representatives on official delegations should meet their own costs. 
However, financial assistance may be considered when non-official attendance directly 
advances the government's objectives. 
Requests for assistance with travel costs for other than participation in official delegations 
should be considered on a case by case basis. Such assistance will only be recommended if it 
directly advances the government's objectives. 
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Annex II 
Conditions Applying To Participants In 
New Zealand Delegations To International Meetings 
Participation on official New Zealand delegations will be subject to the following conditions: 
• The participant will at all times be under the authority of the leader of the delegation or, 
in his/her absence, that of the deputy leader, and will comply with their instructions or 
with any instructions received from the New Zealand authorities. 
• As a participant in an official delegation the participant will act consistently with the 
government's interests as identified in the brief or by the delegation leader. If required 
he/she will also assist in compilation of the delegation report. 
• The confidentiality of information received through participation in the official 
delegation is to be maintained. This information includes government documents, 
restricted conference documents, delegation discussions and such international 
negotiations as are conducted in camera. 
• This confidentiality shall particularly apply to any communications with the press. 
• The participant may brief sponsoring organisations on developments and results in the 
negotiation but only on the basis that any information of a sensitive nature provided to 
sponsoring organisations will not be revealed publicly by them. 
• Any articles written by the participant about the negotiations are subject to the clearance 
of the leader of the delegation or the appropriate government authorities. 
• It is understood that inclusion in the delegation does not imply any obligation on behalf 
of the New Zealand government to meet costs of non-governmental participants. 
/ agree to abide by the above conditions in respect of my inclusion on the New Zealand 
delegation to the 
Signature: 
Name: 
Date: 
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Appendix 4 - Table of Non-Governmental Experts 
Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Professor John Simpson 
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of 
Southampton 
Advisor 
United Kingdom 
Non-Proliferation Treaty- 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004 
PrepComs; 2000 and 2005 RevCons 
Expert advisor, institutional memory 
Not into written statements; participation in daily briefings and 
regular consultation with other delegation members 
Travel and expenses for attendance at meetings 
Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Ernie Regehr 
Senior Advisor, Project Ploughshares 
Various: NGO Advisor and Expert Advisor 
Canada 
2001 UN Conference on SALW; 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004 NPT 
PrepComs; 2000 and 2005 NPT Rev Cons 
Expert advice on policy positions, reporting to NGOs, specific 
research tasks at some NPT meetings 
Commented on draft interventions, responded to discussion of 
positions at daily briefings, drafted working papers 
Travel and expenses for attendance at meetings 
Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Dr. Gotz Neuneck 
Senior Fellow, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, 
University of Hamburg 
Technical Advisor 
Germany 
NPT 
Learning about the process, reporting and building contacts with 
NGOs 
No 
None 
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Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Bev Delong 
Chairperson, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
NPT Liaison 
Canada 
2005 NPT RevCon, 2007, 2008 PrepComs 
Attend NGO events and report to delegation; report to Canadian 
NGOs on conference developments; participate in delegation 
meetings and discussions 
Opportunity to comment on statements and provide input in 
delegation meetings - confidentiality statement required 
Expenses and travel for participation in meetings 
Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Angela Woodward 
Executive Director, VERTIC 
Non-official representative 
New Zealand 
BWC Review Conference, December 2006 
Observe proceedings and side meetings, offer advice and 
comment on positions 
Reviewed and commented on draft statements 
None, external support for travel expenses 
Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Stein Villumstad 
Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian Initiative on Small 
Arms Transfers (NISAT) Coalition 
Advisor 
Norway 
2001 UN Conference on SALW and its PrepComs (3); two 
other regional SALW meetings; bilateral human security 
consultations with Canada 
Input into drafting of statements, bridge between delegation and 
NGO community 
Directly involved in statement drafting 
Travel and expenses for attendance at meetings 
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Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Dr. William (Bill) Potter 
Monterey Institute for International Studies 
Technical Advisor 
Kyrgyzstan 
NPT: 1995, 2000, 2005 RevCons and 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 
2003,2004 and 2007 PrepComs 
To provide technical counsel as needed, institutional memory 
Regular input into statements 
None 
Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Una Becker 
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 
Scientific Advisor 
Germany 
BWC RevCon 2002, 2005; PrepCom 2006; Meeting of States 
Parties 2004, 2005, 2007 
To report on side events and discussions to other delegation 
members; provide background information on states' positions; 
analyse draft documents and comment on general policy 
questions 
Not involved in preparation of draft interventions, but did co-
draft a Working Paper for the 2006 RevCon 
Expenses covered by institute in early years, since 2006 paid for 
by foreign ministry 
Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Florella Hazeley 
Council of Churches in Sierra Leone 
Civil Society member 
Sierra Leone 
2006 RevCon for the UN PoA (unable to attend 2005 PrepCom, 
but participated in preparation) 
Reporting to other NGOs on closed sessions, cooperation with 
Ambassador leading delegation, contributed to country 
statement and national report 
Yes, direct input into government statements 
No support from government, some funding from IANSA for 
expenses 
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Name 
Organizational 
Affiliation 
Title on Delegation 
Country 
Event 
Tasks 
Input into policy 
positions 
Compensation 
Ochieng Adala 
Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum 
Advisor 
Kenya 
UN PoA BMS (2005) and RevCon (2006) 
Consultation on national positions, assistance in drafting 
interventions and position papers, participation in daily 
briefings 
Yes, direct input into government statements 
No support from government, some funding from another NGO 
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Appendix 5 - List of Non-Governmental Experts in 
the Small Arms and Light Weapons Process 
Civil society organisations accredited to government delegations for the UN small 
arms process since 2005 
BMS 2005: 
Argentina (Dario Kosovsky, INECIP) 
Australia (Stephanie Koorey, Australian National University) 
Burundi (Ilhan Berkol, GRIP) 
Canada (David Jackman, QUNO) 
Costa Rica (Luis Alberto Cordero, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress) 
Cote d'lvoire (Claudio Gramizzi, GRIP) 
Finland (Anne Palm, Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network, Sanna Rummakko, 
Peace Union of Finland) 
Germany (Simone Wisotzki, Peace Research Institute, Robert Lindner, Oxfam 
Deutschland) 
Guatemala (Carmen Rosa de Leon, and Mayda de Leon Wantland, IEPADES) 
Ireland (Tony d'Costa, Pax Christi) 
Kenya (Ochieng Adala, African Peace Forum, Peter Gunja, Jan Kamenju, Johnstone 
Kibor, Kenya Coalition Against Landmines, Roselyn Mungai, Oxfam GB) 
Mali (Mohammed Coulibaly, Oxfam GB, Abba Toure, WAANSA) 
Mexico (Mariana Fernandez, CAENI) 
Netherlands (Undule Mwakasungara, CHRR) 
Norway (Nic Marsh, PRIO) 
New Zealand (Philip Alpers, IANSA Pacific, Damien Rogers, Australian National 
University) 
Nigeria (Dickson Orji, NANSA, but he couldn't come) 
Sierra Leone (Florella Hazeley, CCSL, but she couldn't come) 
Sri Lanka (Kingsley Rodrigo, SASA-Net Sri Lanka) 
Trinidad & Tobago (Folade Mutota, WINAD) 
UK (Paul Eavis, Saferworld) 
*In addition, the delegation of Switzerland included Keith Krause and Eric Berman of the 
Small Arms Survey. 
PrepCom 2006: 
Canada (Peggy Mason, Group of 78; Lynn Griffiths-Fulton, Ploughshares) 
Chile (Luis Alvarado, SerPaJ) 
Cote d'lvoire (Claudio Gramizzi, GRIP) 
Finland (Anne Palm, Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network; Sanna Rummakko, 
Peace Union of Finland) 
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Germany (Robert Lindner, Oxfam Deutschland) 
Guatemala (Carmen Rosa de Leon, and Mayda de Leon Wantland, IEPADES) 
Ireland (Tony D'Costa, Pax Christi Ireland) 
Kenya (Ochieng Adala, African Peace Forum; Roselyn Mungai, Oxfam GB) 
Mexico (Roberto Dondisch, CAENI) 
Netherlands (Johnstone Kibor, Kenya Coalition Against Landmines; Holger Anders, 
GRIP) 
Norway (Nic Marsh, PRIO) 
Senegal (Christiane Agboton Johnson, MALAO) 
Uganda (Canon Joyce Nima, UJCC) 
UK (Paul Eavis, Saferworld) 
*In addition, the delegation of Switzerland included Keith Krause and Eric Berman of the 
Small Arms Survey. 
RevCon 2006: 
Australia (Cate Buchanan, HD Centre, and Sam Lee Coalition for Gun Control) 
Canada (Ken Epps, Project Ploughshares) 
Cote d'lvoire (Claudio Gramizzi, GRIP) 
Finland (Anne Palm, Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network, and Laura Lodenius, 
Peace Union of Finland) 
Germany (Robert Lindner, Oxfam Deutschland; Simone Wisotzki, Peace Research 
Institute Frankfurt) 
Guatemala (Carmen Rosa de Leon, and Mayda de Leon Wantland, IEPADES) 
Ireland (Tony D'Costa, Pax Christi Ireland) 
Kenya (Ochieng Adala, African Peace Forum; Roselyn Mungai, Oxfam GB) 
Lesotho (Kathleho Pefole, Transformation Resource Centre) 
Mali (Mohammed Coulibaly, Oxfam GB) 
Mexico (Roberto Dondisch, CAENI; Wendy Cukier, CGC) 
New Zealand (Mary Wareham, Oxfam NZ, and Philip Alpers, IANSA Pacific) 
Niger (Ilhan Berkol, GRIP) 
Norway (Nic Marsh, PRIO) 
Panama (Vicente Blake, ALUDEC) 
Senegal (Christiane Agboton Johnson, MALAO) 
Sierra Leone (Florella Hazeley, SLANSA) 
Spain (Richard Magan, Oxfam Intermom) 
Sri Lanka (Kingsley Rodrigo, PAFFREL) 
Uganda (Canon Joyce Nima, UJCC; Richard Mugisha, People With Disabilities -
Uganda) 
UK (Paul Eavis, Saferworld) 
*In addition, the delegation of Switzerland included Keith Krause and Eric Berman of the 
Small Arms Survey. 
(List Provided by Alun Howard of the International Action Network on Small Arms) 
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